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Richard S. Frase

Sentencing Principles in
Theory and Practice

ABSTRACT

In Norval Morris's "limiting retributivist" theory of punishment,
considerations of "just deserts" set upper and occasionally lower limits
on sentencing severity. Other purposes, including general deterrence,
considerations of equality, and "parsimony," provide the necessary "finetuning." Proponents of just deserts, such as Andrew von Hirsch, give
much greater weight to retributive and equality values and would allow
almost no role for other sentencing goals in the determination of the
severity of individual sentences. The relative severity of sentences must
be closely linked to desert, and parsimony should only be considered in
determining issues such as the overall severity of the sentencing scale.
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, in effect since 1980, are based on a
theory of just deserts, but also give substantial weight to utilitarian
sentencing purposes. This was true even of the original guidelines and is
more true today. The theory of punishment that has evolved is quite
similar to Morris's theory and quite different from von Hirsch's.
Minnesota's fifteen-year experience with guidelines shows that Morris's
theory of punishment is both theoretically sound and practically viable.
Norval Morris's theory of punishment is a theory of "limiting retributivism," in which concepts of "just deserts" set upper and occasionally
lower limits on sentencing severity; within these broad outer limits,
other purposes and principles provide the necessary "fine-tuning."
Richard S. Frase is Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University
of Minnesota Law School. A preliminary version of this article was presented at a conference in honor of Norval Morris, entitled "Crime, Punishment, and Mental Health:
Soundings for the Twenty-first Century," held at the University of Chicago Law School
on October 28-29, 1994.
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Such other purposes and principles include not only traditional crimecontrol purposes (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) but
also considerations of equality (uniformity) and a concept Morris calls
"parsimony": a preference for the least severe alternative that will
achieve the purposes of the particular sentence. However, Morris rejects coerced rehabilitation as a reason for imprisonment or for extending a prison term. He also rejects basing the type or duration of
sentences on individual predictions of dangerousness, except in very
limited situations. His later writings express strong support for sentencing guidelines, provided such guidelines are flexible, and prescribe
intermediate sanctions as well as prison terms.
Proponents of just deserts, such as Andrew von Hirsch, give much
greater weight to retributive and equality values. Indeed, von Hirsch
would allow almost no role for other sentencing goals in the determination of individual sentences. Von Hirsch agrees with Morris that
sentencing severity, and especially the use of incarceration, are excessive in the United States; however, von Hirsch believes that the concept of parsimony should only be used to determine absolute, not relative, sentencing severity (e.g., the maximum and minimum extremes of
the punishment scale) and should not be considered at a case-specific
level. Like Morris, he favors sentencing guidelines and believes that
they should promote broader use of intermediate sanctions; but von
Hirsch insists that the severity of sentences for different offenders must
be closely linked to their deserts.
Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, in effect since 1980, are widely
believed to be based primarily on a just-deserts sentencing theory. In
fact, however, the guidelines have always given substantial weight to
all traditional sentencing purposes: not only retribution and equality,
but also crime-control goals and parsimony (especially in the use of
state prison terms). This hybrid theory is evident even at the level of
theory and formal rules; it is even more evident in practice.
Section I of this essay describes Morris's theory of punishment as it
has evolved over the years. Section II summarizes von Hirsch's critique
of key aspects of Morris's theory and presents the responses Morris has
made, or which could be made, to those criticisms. In Section I, I
describe the theory of punishment which has evolved under the Minnesota guidelines, both in theory and in practice. Section IV reviews
and discusses the many ways in which the guidelines have implemented
Morris's approach. Even the differences between the Minnesotan and
Morris theories generally reflect practical considerations which Morris
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has often noted. I conclude that Minnesota's experience demonstrates
the wisdom of Morris's theory of punishment, which is both theoretically sound and (as proved in Minnesota) practically viable over a substantial period of time.
I Morris's Theory of Punishment
In his first book, The Habitual Criminal, published in 1951, Morris
noted that the theories of criminal punishment being applied by judges
and legislators were neither coherent nor stable over time (quoting a
1902 criminal law text, making the same point) (Morris 1951, p. 8).
However, Morris insisted that specific purposes are being applied, consciously or not, and that an effort must be made to define them more
precisely, to avoid the "fortuitousness" of widely disparate sentences
imposed by different judges in similar cases (Morris 1951, p. 9). Two
years later, Morris again noted that courts "have failed to develop any
agreed principles or practices and that consequently judicial sentencing
lacks uniformity and equality of application, is considerably capricious,
and can be shown to fit neither the crime nor the criminal" (Morris
1953, p. 186). Morris presented sentencing data documenting the extent of existing disparities and proposed a number of reforms.
Thus at the outset of his career, Morris identified and began to address the interrelated problems of sentencing disparity and the conflicting purposes of, and at, sentencing. His earliest works also show
his strong belief in the importance of relating sentencing theory to
sentencing practice-"the actual functioning" of penal sanctions
(Morris 1951, p. 16). Morris is an empiricist and a realist; he wants to
know how judges and other practitioners think and act. Armed with
this information, sentencing theory may reflect the accumulated wisdom of the past and may also avoid imposing highly unpopular rules
which will only be circumvented in practice.
In his early critique of sentencing disparity, and also in some of his
proposals for reform, Morris foreshadowed the revolution that would
later transform the American sentencing process. Although most of his
early reform proposals were intended to improve the quality of sentencing within the traditional "indeterminate" model (e.g., improved
presentence investigations), several of his suggested reforms involved
procedures that would later become central features of sentencing
guidelines. Thus Morris assumed that sentences should be subject to
appellate review (although at that time, such review was minimal in the
British Commonwealth system and almost unheard of in the United

366

Richard S. Frase

States). He also insisted that trial courts should give reasons for their
sentences, if an appeal was filed, and that the appeals court should likewise state reasons for its judgment. Morris further suggested that trial
judges be provided with data on sentences imposed (by offense, offender age, and offender prior record), so that the judges could "see
clearly where they stand in relation to their brethren" (Morris 1953,
p. 200).
Morris's own theory of punishment began to emerge in his 1964
book, Studies in CriminalLaw, coedited with Colin Howard. In an essay by Morris, entitled "Penal Sanctions and Human Rights," Morris
argued that "power over a criminal's life should not be taken in excess
of that which would be taken if reform were not considered one of our
purposes" (Morris and Howard 1964, p. 175). Morris was thus one of
the first mainstream writers to suggest the empirical and moral defects
of the "rehabilitative ideal" of coerced, prison-based treatment linked
to the timing of parole release (see also Allen 1964, pp. 25-41; Allen
1981). In addition, Morris's essay explicitly linked retributive sentencing goals to the human rights of defendants and implied that such
rights place firm upper limits on the severity of punishments imposed
to achieve crime-control purposes (Bottoms 1995, pp. 19, 22-23).
Morris continued his attack on the rehabilitative ideal in his 1970
book, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control (Morris and
Hawkins 1970, chap. 5). Morris questioned whether in-prison treatment programs are effective and argued strongly in favor of community-based sentencing and treatment. He also advocated much broader
use of fines, in lieu of short custodial terms, and argued against statutes
that impose mandatory minimum prison terms or place arbitrary limitations on probation eligibility (Morris and Hawkins 1970, pp. 11213, 115-24, 141-43; see also Morris 1977a, p. 150; Morris 1977b, pp.
279-80; Morris and Hawkins 1977, pp. 60-61; Morris 1993, p. 310).
A. Emergence of Morris's Limiting Retributive Theory
A more comprehensive theory of punishment was presented in 1974
in The Future of Imprisonment. Morris's theory was further developed
in his 1976 lecture, "Punishment, Desert, and Rehabilitation" (Morris
1977a); in his 1982 book, Madness and the Criminal Law; and in his
1990 book (with Michael Tonry), Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System.
In The Future of Imprisonment, Morris attempted to reconcile the numerous and often conflicting purposes of punishment within a theory
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of "limiting" retributivism, in which retributive or "just-deserts" values set upper, and occasionally lower, limits on the nature and severity
of punishment. Although these principles were specifically addressed
to the question of whether a prison term should be imposed, Morris
indicated that they should also apply, "with suitable modifications," to
prison duration and to other sentencing issues (Morris 1974, p. 59).
His later writings on punishment have generally addressed both prison
commitment and prison duration issues.
Morris's upper limits of desert are strict and explicit: "No sanction
should be imposed greater than that which is 'deserved' for the last
crime, or series of crimes" being sentenced (Morris 1974, pp. 60, 7377). However, he strongly emphasized that courts are permitted, but
not obligated, to impose the maximum which the offender deserves
(Morris 1974, p. 75).
In later writings, Morris extended the concept of desert to include
at least some offender-based factors, especially the defendant's prior
record of convictions (Morris 1982, pp. 151-52, 162-63, 184-86;
Morris 1992, p. 145).' Morris has also distinguished between the "societal" and "individual" faces of desert (Morris 1982, p. 161). The former determines the absolute upper and lower desert limits and "is a
reflection of society's official view of what the criminal deserves; it is
not finely tuned." However, within these outer limits, additional moral
distinctions, based on the facts of the particular case, may be considered, along with other punishment goals and factors (Morris 1977b, pp.
275, 280-81; Morris 1982, pp. 151-52, 161, 168-69).
Morris's concept of "societal" desert was perhaps originally intended to correspond to the absolute upper and lower limits set by the
legislature, for each offense, within which courts may consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the particular case ("individual" desert). In a sentencing guidelines system such as Minnesota's
(where presumptive sentencing ranges are often narrower than the
statutory range), a second level of "societal" desert might be recognized: courts could routinely and somewhat loosely consider casespecific desert within the presumptive sentence range but would have
to meet more exacting standards in order to "depart" and impose a
sentence closer to the statutory minimum or maximum.
In Morris's view, desert sometimes also sets lower limits on punish' This article, although published in 1992, was based on Morris's 1982 Cardozo Lecture to the Association of the Bar of New York City.
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ment (i.e., minimum severity requirements); in his words, the sentence
must not "depreciate the seriousness" of the current offense (Morris
1974, pp. 60, 78-79). This language was taken from the Model Penal
Code (American Law Institute 1962, § 7.01(c)). Although Morris usually refers to this as a retributive concept (Morris 1974, p. 78; Morris
1977a, pp. 157-58; Morris 1982, p. 198), the code's language is also
consistent with a long-term deterrent or norm-reinforcing function.
Morris seemed to agree, noting that such minimum severity limits are
needed because "[t]he criminal law has general behavioral standardsetting functions; it acts as a moral teacher" (Morris 1974, p. 78). In
any case, whether for retributive reasons, norm-reinforcement, or
both, Morris felt that strict lower limits on sentencing severity are only
sometimes required (citing, as one example, a case of spousal homicide,
where a prison term might be required even if the offender is no
longer dangerous, and even if granting probation would not cause an
immediate jump in homicide rates) (Morris 1974, p. 78). Finally, as
noted earlier, Morris has consistently opposed mandatory minimum
prison terms and arbitrary limits on probation eligibility (Morris and
Hawkins 1970, pp. 141-43).
Within the upper and lower limits of desert, Morris envisioned a
range of "not undeserved" penalties. In later writings, he characterizes
these ranges as "overlapping and quite broad" (Morris 1982, p. 151).
He also explicitly differentiated his own views from other desert-based
theories by distinguishing between purposes of punishment which are
"defining," those which are "limiting," and those which are only
"guiding" principles (Morris 1977a, pp. 140-42; Morris 1982, pp.
182-87). Morris suggested that deterrent purposes could precisely define the proper punishment, but only if we knew much more than we
now do about the deterrent effects of punishment. As for desert, however, he argued that this concept is inherently too imprecise (and perhaps also too lacking in political and philosophical consensus; Morris
and Tonry 1990, pp. 86-89) to precisely define the sentence; it can
only establish rough outer limits, an allowable sentencing range, beyond which penalties would be widely seen as clearly undeserved (i.e.,
either excessively severe or excessively lenient) (Morris 1977a, pp.
158-59; Morris 1982, pp. 198-99; Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 1045). Within those broad ranges of desert, other punishment goals, acting as "guiding principles," will interact to "fine-tune" the sentence.
A guiding principle is defined as "a general value which should be re-
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spected unless other values sufficiently strongly justify its rejection in
any given case" (Morris 1977a, p. 142).
B. The Role of Various Nonretributive Sentencing Factors
What, then, are the "guiding principles" in Morris's theory, which
provide the necessary fine-tuning between retributive upper and lower
limits, and what precise role does each play?
1. Rehabilitation. Morris was an early critic of the "rehabilitative
ideal" of coerced, in-prison treatment linked to the timing of parole
release (Morris 1964, p. 175). He greatly expanded on this critique in
later writings (Morris and Hawkins 1970, chap. 5; Morris 1974, pp.
12-27; Morris 1977a, p. 139; Morris and Hawkins 1977, chap. 6).
First, he argued, postprison risk cannot reliably be predicted based on
in-prison behavior. Moreover, coerced in-prison treatment programs
waste resources on unamenable subjects, while encouraging feigned
cooperation which may actually preclude genuine reform. Finally, returning to the human rights theme of his earlier writings, Morris argued that such coercive treatment would be morally wrong even if it
were effective.
Thus Morris concluded that rehabilitation is not a reason either to
impose or to extend a prison sentence; furthermore, all in-prison treatment programs must be entirely voluntary and not linked to the timing
of release. However, the inmate may be compelled to participate in
such a treatment program long enough to "know what it is about"
(Morris 1974, pp. 18-19). Moreover, Morris has long been a strong
advocate of community treatment and apparently does not object to
conditioning the terms of probationary or parole release on participation in an appropriate community-based treatment program-at least
one "closely and directly" related to the conviction offense (Morris
and Hawkins 1970, pp. 112-13, 118-24; Morris 1974, pp. 34, 42-43;
Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 186-203, 206-12).
2. Incapacitation. Morris's second guiding principle, proposed in
The Future of Imprisonment, was similarly in conflict with traditional
goals and practices of indeterminate sentencing. Morris was opposed
to basing prison commitment, duration, and release decisions on individualized assessments of the defendant's degree of "dangerousness"
(Morris 1974, pp. 62-73; Morris 1977b, pp. 276-77). Again, Morris
argued that we lack the ability accurately to predict future behavior
and are very likely to err on the side of massive overprediction and
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overincarceration. The latter excesses occur because of the vague and
expansive nature of the notion of "dangerousness." There are also
strong political and bureaucratic pressures to err on the side of detention (since "only" criminals are being unnecessarily detained, and their
very detention prevents us from knowing which ones would have been
safe to release-what Morris calls the "mask of overprediction") (Morris 1974, p. 68). Thus Morris concluded: "Prediction of future criminality is an unjust basis for determining that the convicted criminal
should be imprisoned . . . or for prolonging its term" (Morris 1974,
pp. 59-60, 66).
Morris acknowledged, however, that the fear of crime in general (not
just fear of what this particular defendant will do in the future) may
help to determine the retributive upper limits of punishment. Such fear
might be based on the frequency and distribution of that type of crime,
"a few sensational events," "a wave of widely reported crimes," and
even the "brutal or mitigating details" of the current offense (Morris
1974, p. 76; see also Morris 1982, pp. 161-62). Morris would also permit parole decisions to be based on actuarial predictions (i.e., "base
expectancy rates" of parole success, for various offender categories)
(Morris 1977a, p. 148) and would allow "anamnestic" predictions
(based on the defendant's past behavior) to influence conditions of parole release (Morris 1974, p. 34).2
In later writings, Morris-always the realist-recognized that individualized predictions of dangerousness will be made, whether they are
formally permitted or not (Morris 1992, p. 139). He therefore sought
to define the narrow conditions under which such predictions might
be a fair and effective basis for prison commitment and duration decisions. In particular, he argued that sentencing severity may be increased (up to the retributive maximum) if "reliable actuarial data" indicate that the defendant's risk of assaultive behavior is "substantially"
higher than that of other offenders with very similar prior records and
current offenses (Morris 1982, pp. 166-72; Morris 1992, pp. 138-47;
see also Morris and Miller 1985; and Miller and Morris 1986). However, Morris felt that these conditions would rarely be met. Indeed, it

2 However, Morris favored a fixed duration of parole, rather than the traditional "unexpired term" concept under which the "best risks" (those released earliest) have the
longest period of supervision, while the worst risks (those released late, or after "maxing
out") have little or no parole aftercare (Morris and Hawkins 1970, pp. 113, 142).
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seems likely that they will never be met, since the only "reliable actuarial data" likely to be available would be for groups of offenders with
similar prior record and current offense-without distinguishing, as
Morris requires, among offenders within each such group.
3. Failure of Prior, Lesser Penalties; Categoric Recidivist Enhancements.
In The Future of Imprisonment, Morris argued that increased severity
(up to the retributive maximum) is appropriate when "other less restrictive sanctions have been frequently or recently applied to this offender" (Morris 1974, pp. 60, 79-80). Morris seemed to base this provision on retributive grounds-when "lesser sanctions have been
appropriately applied and contumaciously ignored... the criminal law
must keep its retributive promises" (Morris 1974, pp. 79-80).' However, such increases in punishment might also be justified on a theory
of special deterrence (also sometimes referred to as specific or individual deterrence) (Zimring and Hawkins 1973, pp. 72-74, 224): if the
offender did not "get the message" before, increased severity is needed
to "get his attention" (or perhaps, to counteract particularly strong
temptation). So viewed, special deterrence will sometimes raise the
necessary and appropriate penalty above the retributive minimum required.
The imposition of greater severity in such cases might also be justified on grounds of prevention (i.e., incapacitation) of high-risk defendants. Although Morris rejected incarceration based on individualized
predictions of dangerousness, he approved of parole release decisions
based on actuarial (group, or categoric) predictions of risk. He has also
stated that prior convictions are a legitimate reason for sentence enhancement-not only for reasons of desert but also because of the
recidivist's statistically greater likelihood of reoffending: "The best
predictor of future criminality is past criminality" (Morris 1982,
pp. 162-63).
4. General Deterrence. Morris felt that we lack the necessary data
to permit general deterrence to serve as a "defining" goal which would
precisely calibrate punishment in each case (Morris 1977a, pp. 14042; Morris 1982, pp. 182-83). However, within the retributive upper
and lower limits, Morris viewed general deterrence as an appropriate
3 For discussions of various retributive justification for the increased punishment of
recidivists, see von Hirsch (1981a); von Hirsch (1985, pp. 77-91); Ashworth (1992, pp.
147-50).
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guiding factor. Thus he would permit sentencing severity to be increased (up to the retributive maximum) if such an increase "isnecessary to achieve socially justified deterrent purposes, and the punishment of this offender is an appropriate vehicle to this end" (Morris
1974, pp. 60, 79).
In particular, Morris approved of the practice of imposing additional
severity "to capture public attention and to deter such behavior by a
dramatic punishment"-what Morris calls "exemplary" sentences
(Morris 1977a, pp. 151-53; Morris 1982, pp. 187-88). As one example,
he cites a British judge's imposition of four-year prison terms (at least
double the term normally imposed for the offense) for racially motivated attacks (the Notting Hill cases). Another of his examples is Chicago's annual pre-Christmas crackdown on drunk drivers, designed to
counteract the increased incidence of this crime during the holiday period.
Morris would also allow sentences to be mitigated for deterrent purposes-overall, or by some random process of selection-if the crime
in question could be controlled effectively by very minor or occasional
penalties. His favorite example is federal income tax enforcement
(Morris 1974, p. 79), especially for certain, highly risk-averse offenders. Thus of "six Denver doctors" accused of tax fraud, only some need
be prosecuted and imprisoned to achieve adequate deterrence (Morris
1977a, pp. 153-56; Morris 1982, pp. 189-92). Given the perennial
lack of resources to fully enforce all criminal laws, Morris suggests that
selective enforcement and mitigated punishment are a practical necessity; however, for reasons of "parsimony" he would advocate deterrent
selectivity even if resources were adequate to permit more frequent
and severe punishment (Morris 1977a, pp. 156-58; Morris 1982, pp.
189-90).
5. Equality (or Uniformity). Morris accords the goal of uniformity
in sentencing a lower priority than do many just-deserts theorists (and
also, perhaps, many supporters of sentencing guidelines). In Morris's
view, the goal of equality in punishment is an important consideration
in fine-tuning the sentence, "but it is by no means a categorical imperative .. .the principle of equality-that like cases should be treated
alike-is.., only a guiding principle which will enjoin equality of punishment unless there are other substantial utilitarian reasons to the
contrary" (e.g., "exemplary" deterrent enhancement, or "parsimonious" deterrent mitigation) (Morris 1982, pp. 160, 198; see also Morris
1977a, pp. 137, 142). Morris acknowledges "the long tradition of jus-
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tice as equality" (Morris 1982, p. 204) and also recognizes that equality
is an especially important value in the American context (Morris 1982,
p. 180). Nevertheless, he argues that, within the range of "not undeserved" penalties, punishment can be unequal-and even, in some
sense, "unfair"-and yet still be "just" (Morris 1977a, pp. 151-63;
Morris 1982, pp. 187-92).
Morris points to a number of traditional law enforcement and sentencing practices that are flatly inconsistent with a very restrictive requirement of equality. In particular, he cites the use of selective prosecution, exemplary sentences, and deterrent parsimony; the grant of
leniency to defendants who turn state's evidence; the traditional pardon and amnesty powers; and the use of early parole release to avoid
prison overcrowding. Morris recognizes that equality values are traditionally viewed as strongest at the point of sentencing and are weaker
both in the earlier, police- and prosecutor-controlled stages and in the
later correctional processes. Nevertheless, he believes that, in light of
such substantial (and, perhaps, inevitable) systemwide inequality, the
sentencing process cannot, and should not, attempt to observe strict
equality constraints (Morris 1982, pp. 206-8). This conclusion also
follows from his strong belief in the concept of "parsimony," which
"overcomes the principle of equality" (Morris 1977a, p. 154; Morris
1982, p. 191).
6. Parsimony. In The Future of Imprisonment, Morris argued that
one of the most important guiding principles of sentencing is that
"[t]he least restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to achieve defined
social purposes should be imposed" (Morris 1974, p. 59). Morris found
direct support for this principle in the American Bar Association's Sentencing Standards (American Bar Association 1968, § 2.2)1 and implicit
support in recent National Crime Commission proposals and in the
Model Penal Code's general presumption in favor of probation (American Law Institute 1962, § 7.01). He further argued that important analogues of the principle can be found in cases interpreting the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments (since "any punitive suffering
beyond societal needs is what, in this context, defines cruelty") and in
mental health and juvenile justice dispositional standards (Morris 1974,
pp. 60-62).
For Morris, the principle of parsimony "is both utilitarian and hu4 The principle is also found in the second and third editions of these standards
(American Bar Association 1979, § 18-2.2; American Bar Association 1993, §§ 18-2.4
and 18-6.1).
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manitarian" (Morris 1974, p. 61). The concept has long been a central
tenet of utilitarian philosophy. As Michael Tonry points out, writers
at least as far back as Jeremy Bentham (1789) argued that "punishment
itself is an evil and should be used as sparingly as possible . . . 'it ought
only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil'" (Tonry 1994, p. 63, quoting Bentham). Parsimony is also perhaps a necessary (or at least a natural) corollary of a theory of limiting
retributivism; if judges are permitted broad rather than narrow ranges
of "just" punishment, some overarching principle such as parsimony is
needed to give them more guidance, or at least a more precise "starting
point."
Broader sentencing ranges, combined with the principle of parsimony, permit and encourage the exercise of mercy. As Morris eloquently put it, "justice and mercy both have roles in the criminal justice system; mercy cannot be precisely quantified and institutionalized
or it ceases to be mercy and becomes leniency; mercy is the trump that
can capture equality's ace and allow punishment at the bottom range
of a deserved punishment" (Morris 1982, p. 180). Parsimony in the use
of custodial sentences also permits the preservation of the defendant's
social ties (Morris 1974, pp. 8, 75) and the avoidance of needless suffering and expense (Morris 1977a, p. 154). In any event, Morris argued, the ability to grant case-level mitigation of punishment, without
strict desert or equality constraints, is a necessary and inevitable feature
of our chronically overloaded and underfunded criminal justice system
(Morris 1977a, pp. 156-58; Morris 1982, p. 190).
To summarize, Morris believed that judges should use the lower end
of the range of "deserved" punishments as a starting point and should
increase that penalty only if (and only to the extent that) one or more
of his other "guiding" factors requires increased severity in the particular case. Thus the specific sentence would be determined by whichever factor required the greatest severity (general deterrence, failure of
prior lesser penalties, and [very rarely] actuarially based predictions of
dangerousness).
Case-specific ("individual") desert considerations are also relevant.
Morris would probably say that case-specific desert imposes strict upper limits on punishment (i.e., that it lowers the maximum severity that
may be imposed for utilitarian reasons). However, given his general
view that lower desert limits are more flexible, he might argue that
only cases of exceptionally aggravated culpability should serve to raise
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the judge's "starting point" (i.e., the minimum of the statutory or
guidelines range), before consideration of utilitarian goals.
It is not clear exactly how Morris's guiding principle of equality is
reconciled with the principle of parsimony, since the two will often be
in conflict. However, if the presumption in favor of the least severe
sentence is a strong presumption, and if judges thus usually sentence
near the bottom of the "not-undeserved" range, then sentences will
tend to be fairly uniform among offenders whose cases fall into the
same range. Morris probably did expect that sentences would cluster
near the bottom of the desert range-if only for lack of sufficient utilitarian justification for raising them higher; he has often argued that
criminal laws and punishments have very little effect on crime rates
(Morris 1977b, pp. 267-69; Morris 1993, p. 309).
7. Rewarding Defendant Cooperation (Especially Guilty Pleas). As everyone familiar with American criminal courts knows, the most important "guiding" factor in sentencing is often the defendant's plea. Morris expressed dislike for the exchange of "concessions" for guilty pleas
(Morris 1974, p. 52) and the resulting coercion, overcharging, and distortion of the sentencing process (Morris 1977a, p. 147; Morris and
Hawkins 1977, pp. 57-58). But Morris is a realist and recognizes the
practical reasons that underlie the grant of leniency to defendants who
"cooperate." His proposed alternative to traditional plea bargaining is
a pretrial "settlement" conference, attended by the judge, prosecutor,
defense attorney, defendant, and victim (Morris 1974, pp. 50-57; see
also Heinz and Kerstetter 1979, passim, reporting on the successful
implementation of Morris's proposal in Dade County, Florida). This
procedure is intended to better regulate the process; however, it appears to assume considerable flexibility in sentencing and does not rule
out charge and/or sentence mitigations resulting from the conference.
For similar practical reasons, Morris recognized the need to grant
good-conduct ("good-time") reductions of prison terms to encourage
cooperation and maintain order (Morris 1974, p. 49; Morris 1977b, p.
277). He also appeared to approve of the occasional grant of even earlier release, where necessary to avoid or lessen serious prison overcrowding problems (Morris 1982, p. 189).
It is not clear how the cooperation mitigations noted above should
be incorporated into Morris's desert-range-with-parsimony theory. If
such mitigations are not to undercut essential (nothing-less-will-do)
crime control measures, it would seem necessary to initially add some
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additional severity (within desert limits) to what the latter measures
minimally require, in order to leave room for cooperation-rewarding
mitigations. For example, prison terms would need to be increased by
the maximum good-time credits prisoners may earn.
C. Morris on Sentencing Guidelines
Morris opposed legislatively drafted determinate sentencing reforms, when they were first proposed and enacted in the mid-1970s
(Morris 1977a, pp. 149, 164; Morris 1977b, pp. 272-81). He recognized (as he had since 1951) that sentencing disparity is a serious problem but felt that the solution was not to impose excessive legislative
rigidity; the necessary "fine-tuning" of the sentence must be done by
the trial court (Morris 1977b, pp. 272-75). Thus he preferred to continue on the path of criminal law reform (recodification; statutory
guiding principles) inspired by the Model Penal Code (Morris 1977b,
pp. 275-76). At the same time, Morris strongly advocated two reforms
which subsequently became essential features of most sentencing
guidelines systems: the requirement that trial judges state reasons for
their sentences and appellate review of sentences (Morris 1977a,
pp. 149-50, 164-65; Morris 1977b, pp. 275-76; Morris and Hawkins
1977, pp. 59-60). Morris hoped that these reforms would facilitate the
gradual evolution of binding precedents on frequently occurring issues-what he termed a "common law of sentencing."
Morris gave qualified support to the earliest federal bills calling for
the creation of a sentencing commission to promulgate guidelinesprovided that such guidelines retained sufficient judicial discretion
(Morris 1977a, pp. 149-50, 165; Morris 1977b, pp. 276, 281-85). His
support was due in part to the fact that these bills included requirements of trial court reasons and appellate review. However, Morris
may also have recognized the value of having an independent commission make case-level sentencing policy. In The Future of Imprisonment,
Morris had identified an important "latent" function of the parole
board: the precise timing of prison release could be determined at a
time and place removed from the "emotional intensity" and the
"searchlight of public attention" that often attends the trial and initial
(maximum) sentence determination (Morris 1974, pp. 36-37, 39, 48).
Later, in Madness and the Criminal Law, Morris noted a similar problem with legislative control over case-level sentencing severity: political pressures to be "tough on crime" inevitably cause legislators to set
penalties based on the "worst" case of each type (Morris 1982, p. 158).
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Thus if parole-release discretion were to be eliminated, under sentencing guidelines, 5 and prisoners were then expected to serve most of the
sentence imposed by the court, the shorter (but "real-time") presumptive sentences must be set by a body independent of the legislature.
This "insulation" argument subsequently became, and remains, one of
the major justifications for commission-based sentencing guidelines
(Frase 1991a, pp. 729-30).
In his later writings, Morris gave much stronger support to the new
(commission-based) sentencing guidelines movement (Morris 1982,
pp. 172-76; Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 48-49; Morris 1993, p. 307,
309). Nevertheless, he has criticized state and federal guidelines for
putting too much emphasis on prison sentences, without enough attention to the wide variety of "intermediate" sanctions more restrictive
than straight probation (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 37-42; Morris
1993, pp. 307-8, 310).
In his book written with Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation, Morris proposed to replace the "two-zone" systems found in most
state guidelines grids (presumed prison; presumed probation) with a
system employing multiple presumptions and multiple sanction types
(Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3). For example, he expressed strong
support for the "four-zone" system proposed by the District of Columbia Sentencing Guidelines Commission: the least serious group of
offenders receive only community-based sanctions (e.g., probation,
fine, restitution, and/or community service); cases in the second, more
serious, group may receive either a community sentence or custody,
with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the former; for the third
group, judges would have the same choices, but without the presumption; in the most serious cases, a custodial sentence was specified (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 60, 77).
To further guide judges, and encourage the use of noncustodial
sanctions, Morris and Tonry proposed the development of a system of
"interchangeable" punishments (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 75-81,
90-92). Judges would first decide the primary purposes to be served
by that offender's sentence; the judge would then select a package of
IExcept for the latent function noted in text, Morris was quite willing to abolish parole release discretion. He felt that such discretion could not be justified by the need to
make individualized assessments of reform and/or dangerousness (which he rejected) and
was not needed to maintain prison discipline, maximize deterrence, avoid prison overcrowding, or rectify unjust disparities; each of the latter functions could be better served
by other means (or were not being effectively served by parole discretion in any case)
(Morris 1977b, pp. 276-79).
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sanctions designed to achieve those purposes (and no more severe than
necessary to do so) (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 90-92). Similarly situated offenders (i.e., those with similar conviction offense and prior
record) would receive sanction combinations roughly equal in their
overall punitiveness. This would be achieved by means of "equivalency
scales," defining the relative severity of different sanction types (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 92-108)-for example, two months of home
detention equals one month of imprisonment.
Very serious cases were excluded from the proposal above, for both
theoretical and practical reasons (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 78-79,
123). In such cases, any sentence other than prison would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense (thus violating Morris's retributive minimum); also, such offenders are likely to be violent, and thus in need of
custodial restraint. As a practical matter, it is difficult to enforce community-based sanctions equivalent in severity to very long prison terms
(Morris and Tonry 1990, p. 173). At the other end of the severity spectrum, "trifling" cases were also excluded (Morris and Tonry 1990,
p. 79)-presumably because principles of parsimony call for nothing
more severe than straight probation.
D. Summary
Morris's theory of punishment is both principled and pragmatic.
Some features are based on strong normative arguments. However, as
foreshadowed in his first book, he has also very deliberately tried to
fashion a theory that is congruent with the widely held values and practices of judges and other system actors. In opting for a hybrid theory,
seeking to balance conflicting punishment goals, case-specific factors,
and practical realities, Morris recognized (quoting H. L. A. Hart) that
"the pursuit of one aim may be qualified by the pursuit of others"; in
the end, he concluded, "there is no universal formula ... penal policy
always represents a choice among a plurality of aims and objectives and
every decision we reach may be attended by some disadvantages"
(Morris and Hawkins 1970, p. 123).
II. Von Hirsch's Critique, and Morris's Response
Von Hirsch is probably the best-known American advocate of the
"just-deserts" model of sentencing (von Hirsch 1976, 1981a, 1981b,
1985, 1992, 1993), and he has frequently criticized Morris's theory of
punishment. In this section, I outline the general principles of von
Hirsch's own theory, summarize his major objections to Morris's
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views, and consider the responses that Morris has made, or which
could be made, to these criticisms.
A. Summary of von Hirsch's Sentencing Theory
In Morris's terms, von Hirsch is a "defining" retributivist: desert
and equality goals define, within narrow limits, the precise degree of
punishment severity which each offender must receive, relative to
other offenders. Von Hirsch believes that the criminal law is primarily
and essentially a "blaming" institution and that criminal penalties
properly convey "censure" to the offender as well as the public (von
Hirsch 1976, chap. 8; von Hirsch 1985, chap. 3; von Hirsch 1993, passim). Such expressions of blame serve to recognize the importance of
the individual and societal rights violated by the offense and also confirm the offender's responsibility by addressing him or her as a responsible moral agent, capable of understanding right and wrong (von
Hirsch 1992, p. 67). In such a system, the relative severity of sanctions
imposed on different offenders must be closely correlated with the relative blameworthiness of these offenders (the requirement of "ordinal
proportionality"), and equally culpable offenders must receive equally
severe sanctions (the requirement of "parity") (von Hirsch 1985, p. 40;
von Hirsch 1992, p. 79).
The concept of "ordinal" proportionality deals with issues of relative
severity-the rank order and spacing of severity increments of penalties, for offenses of increasing seriousness. Von Hirsch distinguishes
sharply between ordinal proportionality and "cardinal proportionality"-the determination of absolute degrees and types of severity (von
Hirsch 1985, pp. 39-40; von Hirsch 1992, pp. 83-84). For von Hirsch,
there are at least two important issues of cardinal proportionality
which must be addressed in any punishment system: the definition of
the upper and lower extremes ("anchoring points") of the punishment
scale (e.g., death, and/or the maximum prison term; suspended sentence, or other least severe authorized penalty) (von Hirsch 1985, pp.
92-94; 1992, pp. 75-79, 83-85); and the exact placement of lines dividing different zones or types of punishment (e.g., the point at which
incarceration is the appropriate disposition rather than some relatively
severe noncustodial penalty) (von Hirsch 1981b, pp. 787-89).6
6 A third issue is treated by von Hirsch in a manner somewhat similar to questions of
cardinal desert. That issue is whether "hard treatment" such as prison is the required
means with which to express censure or whether more symbolic, verbal denunciation is
sufficient. Von Hirsch believes that this choice is not determined by the logic of desert
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Von Hirsch views the requirements of cardinal desert as much less
constraining than those of ordinal desert. Like Morris's view of desert
generally, von Hirsch feels it is difficult to say exactly what absolute
degree or type of severity each offender deserves; but we can at least
say that some penalty scales are clearly too severe or too lenient in the
type or degree of sanctions (von Hirsch 1985, pp. 43-46). Given this
greater degree of uncertainty, von Hirsch would allow the legislature
or sentencing commission to consider nonretributive goals-including
crime control, parsimony, and available resources-when deciding issues of cardinal proportionality (von Hirsch 1985, p. 45; von Hirsch
1987b, pp. 94-95; von Hirsch 1992, pp. 83-84). But he would rarely
allow either crime-control or parsimony goals to affect the ordinal proportionality decisions made by the legislature or sentencing commission, nor would he allow such goals to be considered by judges on a
case-specific basis (von Hirsch 1985, pp. 40-46).
B. Von Hirsch's Critique of Morris's Theory
Von Hirsch finds Morris's sentencing theory vague, unfair, and
likely to produce unduly severe results (von Hirsch 1981b, pp. 772-89;
von Hirsch 1984, pp. 1094-1110; von Hirsch 1985, pp. 38-46, 13946; von Hirsch 1992, pp. 89-90; von Hirsch 1993, pp. 64-68).' His
specific questions and criticisms are summarized below.
Just how broad are the desert ranges, he asks-except for very serious offenses, would anything from a suspended sentence to the statutory maximum prison term be permitted? Does desert "substantially
constrain" the sentence, or is it "relegated to the margins?" (von
Hirsch 1981b, p. 785). Furthermore, how are these ranges set? What
specific factors should legislators or guidelines commission members
consider, in setting anchoring points or range widths? How are courts
supposed to apply Morris's numerous but conflicting "guiding principles," to determine the precise sentence within the range?
Von Hirsch also questions the precise meaning of "mercy," which
Morris says his broader ranges permit. Von Hirsch believes that this
concept may be closely related to "desert"; if so, he argues, it does not
operate within desert limits but rather serves to define the truly deserved sentence (von Hirsch 1984, pp. 1107-8).
and (like the two "cardinal" desert issues noted in text) depends instead on crimeprevention needs (von Hirsch 1992, pp. 73-74).
' See also von Hirsch (1994, pp. 39-49) and von Hirsch (1995, pp. 160-61, 163-64,
n. 32), criticizing this author's previous writings defending Morris's limiting retributive
theory, as adopted in Minnesota.
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Similarly, what is "parsimony"? If this is simply the traditional utilitarian goal of maximizing efficiency (no more expense, pain, or other
"cost" than is necessary to achieve all legitimate utilitarian purposes),
then it is a consequence of pursuing utilitarian goals, not a justification
for choosing or preferring such goals. Although admitting that Morris
himself avoids such circular reasoning, von Hirsch notes that other advocates of parsimony have not (von Hirsch 1984, p. 1107).
Von Hirsch also faults Morris for using current or past sentencing
practices (e.g., the imposition of exemplary sentences) to argue for his
theory: "Citing the existence of a sentencing practice does not demonstrate the justice of that practice" (von Hirsch 1984, p. 1104; emphasis
in original).
Von Hirsch and Morris are in fundamental disagreement on the
meaning of "justice" and "fairness." In von Hirsch's view, Morris's
limiting retributive theory would allow routine imposition of unequal
penalties on equally culpable offenders and would even permit less severe punishment to be given to more culpable offenders (von Hirsch
1984, pp. 1102-3; von Hirsch 1992, p. 76; von Hirsch 1994, p. 45; von
Hirsch 1995, pp. 163-64, n. 32). This is simply too unfair, and it violates the basic premises of criminal law as a "blaming" institution. Von
Hirsch is also critical of Morris's willingness to give prior convictions
a significant role in defining the outer limits of desert; in von Hirsch's
view, the proper role of criminal history is quite modest (von Hirsch
1985, pp. 77-91; von Hirsch 1994, pp. 39-40).
Finally, von Hirsch questions whether application of a limiting retributive theory, even one which included Morris's principle of parsimony, would promote lower, more reasonable degrees of sentencing
severity (von Hirsch 1984, pp. 1104-7; von Hirsch 1985, pp. 140-46;
von Hirsch 1993, pp. 67-68; von Hirsch 1994, pp. 43-46). Von Hirsch
appears to agree with Morris that sentencing severity, and especially
the use of incarceration, is excessive in the United States. However,
von Hirsch believes that sufficient leniency can be achieved without
sacrificing ordinal proportionality and parity, by simply lowering the
upper and lower anchoring points of the punishment scale and encouraging judges to forgo custodial penalties in favor of noncustodial, intermediate sanctions of approximately equal severity (von Hirsch,
Wasik, and Greene 1989, pp. 599, 604-6; von Hirsch 1992, pp. 80,
92-93).
Von Hirsch feels that giving judges a broad sentencing range may
actually invite excessive punishment, not parsimony-judges may
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choose sentences closer to the maximum end, and legislators or sentencing commissioners may feel freer to increase these maxima than
they would under a more "defining" desert scheme. In any case, lowering sentences for some offenders almost inevitably means raising
them for others. "Parsimonyfor whom?" von Hirsch asks; the offenders
receiving increased punishment will not appreciate the parsimony extended to others (von Hirsch 1984, pp. 1106-7; emphasis in original).
C. Morris's Response to von Hirsch's Criticisms
Morris has not written a comprehensive rejoinder to von Hirsch's
criticisms, although he has responded specifically to some of them
(Morris 1982, pp. 202-5; Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 84-90). The
summary below is based on the latter responses; on arguments Morris
has indirectly aimed, over the years, at von Hirsch's theory; and on my
assessment, based on all of Morris's work, of the additional arguments
Morris could make to round out his reply.
On the initial question of range width, and the relative importance
of desert and nondesert goals, Morris agrees that the very "modest"
role of desert, under the American Bar Association's second edition of
its sentencing standards (American Bar Association 1979), goes too far;
Morris favors stronger desert constraints, in "an ordered system of
justly deserved punishments" (Morris 1982, p. 203). In his later writings, Morris gave strong support to sentencing guidelines, particularly
the Minnesota version. This implies that his suggested ranges are comparable in width to the cells on the Minnesota guidelines grid. At one
point, in discussing how a sentencing commission might set presumptive terms for second-offense purse snatchers, Morris suggested that a
range running from probation to six-months' custody would be appropriate (Morris 1982, pp. 194-96).8
Von Hirsch finds Morris's praise of the Minnesota guidelines curious, since he feels that these guidelines "come close to adopting the
desert parity that Morris wishes to reject" (von Hirsch 1984, p. 1100,
n. 29). To this, Morris might reply (having read Sec. III below), that
the Minnesota guidelines do not, in fact, give "desert parity" nearly as
big a role as von Hirsch claims. He would also point out that even von
Hirsch allows some flexibility in the application of his ordinal proportionality principle: sanctions for equally culpable offenders need only

I See also Morris and Tonry (1990), p. 90 (of three like-situated offenders, one might
appropriately receive a six-month prison term; the second, a substantial fine; and the
third, required participation in a drug treatment program).
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be "approximately" equivalent in severity (von Hirsch 1992, pp. 80,
92-93), and the gradations (spacing) of penalties for crimes of increasing severity "are likely to be matters of inexact judgment" (von Hirsch
1992, p. 83).
As to the method by which desert ranges would be defined, Morris
implies that this is ultimately a political decision, which could be made
in a variety of ways, including public or judicial surveys and legislative
or sentencing commission deliberation and consensus building (Morris
and Tonry 1990, p. 85). It would also seem that Morris (or the sentencing commission) could employ von Hirsch's own methods of ordinal ranking and spacing to produce one series of proportioned upper
limits (Tonry 1994, p. 80), tied to appropriate desert-based categories
of conviction offense and prior record, and a second series of proportioned lower limits (at least for those offenses deemed serious enough
to require minimum desert standards). Finally, as previously discussed,
Morris's theory does provide considerable guidance to judges in picking the precise sentence within the outer limits of desert: judges should
start at the bottom of the range and increase severity only to the extent
needed to meet all appropriate utilitarian and case-specific desert
needs.
On the meaning and importance of "mercy," Morris might agree
that this is sometimes related to desert (and he agrees that such casespecific desert factors have a role to play in fine-tuning the sentence).
However, Morris would also say that von Hirsch leaves insufficient
room for appropriate exercise of case-level mercy that is unrelated to
desert-for example, the traditional pardon and amnesty power, and
the grant of early release to relieve prison overcrowding. Another example of undeserved mercy, discussed by Morris, is the parable of the
prodigal son (Morris 1982, pp. 205-6). Morris argued that there are
useful sentencing analogies to the theological issues of repentance, forgiveness, and divine mercy illustrated by the parable. The theme of
forgiveness is also emphasized in Morris's proposal to include the victim in a pretrial settlement conference (Morris 1974, pp. 56-57). In
retrospect, it seems that Morris anticipated the development of the
theory of restorative justice, which emphasizes the importance of defendant acceptance of responsibility, victim forgiveness, and victimoffender reconciliation (Cragg 1992, passim, but esp. pp. 204-17).
Morris would also argue that judges must have broad discretion to
mitigate sentencing severity if (as von Hirsch himself advocates) courts
are to make greater use of intermediate sanctions. As a practical mat-
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ter, any theory requiring rigid "equality of suffering" among offenders
with similar offense and prior record precludes frequent substitution
of noncustodial sanctions-for example, lengthy community service
obligations are difficult to enforce (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 16869, 173). A rigid theory of equality and desert thus forces judges to
impose needless and expensive incarceration that serves no social good
other than to provide symbolic denunciation (and, perhaps, "miseryloves-company" satisfaction). As discussed more fully below, Morris
gives little weight to the latter grounds. In his more recent writings,
von Hirsch seems to agree that relaxing desert constraints would facilitate substitution of noncustodial penalties (von Hirsch 1992, pp. 9293). However, he appears unwilling to accept any major departures
from his central principles of parity and ordinal desert.
As for von Hirsch's point that the existence of a practice does not
necessarily prove its validity, Morris would almost certainly agree.
However, he might counter that the existence of a widespread practice
often says something about our basic moral and societal values, which
is why philosophers (including von Hirsch himself; von Hirsch 1981a,
pp. 595-613) traditionally have cited everyday concepts and practices
to illustrate fundamental moral principles. Morris would also point out
that the abstract justice or logic of a theory does not guarantee that
judges and other practitioners will accept it in practice. Morris recognized that these system actors are strongly committed to pursuing a
variety of sentencing goals and will never accept a pure, one-dimensional retributive theory (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 87-88). If such
a theory were forced on them, they would use their remaining, unregulated discretionary powers to undercut it (Morris 1982, p. 158; Morris
1992, p. 139).
Morris also questions the internal logic and persuasiveness of von
Hirsch's theory. Von Hirsch concedes that "cardinal" desert is difficult
to precisely define; Morris questions whether "ordinal" desert is really
so different. For Morris, "judgments of comparable [i.e, ordinal] culpability are enormously difficult to make," given the imprecision of offense categories and criminal history records, the ambiguities of social
deprivation, and other factual and moral uncertainties (Morris and
Tonry 1990, p. 87). How-other than by simply assuming it-can von
Hirsch be so sure that ordinal ranking and spacing decisions permit a
high degree of societal consensus and precision as to desert? And how
can he categorically rule out any consideration of nondesert factors, in
making ordinal decisions?
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Indeed, is the cardinal/ordinal distinction even that clear? Von
Hirsch considers a guidelines commission's decision about where to
draw the "in/out" line (presumptive prison/presumptive probation) to
be an example of cardinal (absolute) desert, thus permitting much
greater flexibility and the consideration of nondesert factors. But in
practice, the imposition of a prison sentence often results in a major
"step-up," at least in symbolic denunciation (and often also in actual
severity), when compared to the most severe nonprison sanction. Thus
wherever the in/out line is drawn, it is likely to violate von Hirsch's
requirements for precise ordinal spacing-increased severity directly
proportional to increased blame.
Morris might also question von Hirsch's assumption that the sentencing process is a "blaming" or "censuring" institution (and therefore by its very nature, must impose penalties conforming to strict
standards of ordinal desert). This essential premise seems somewhat
at odds with von Hirsch's view that "cardinal" issues may be strongly
influenced by crime-control purposes. Decisions on cardinal issuesthe absolute severity and the form of punishments-determine the basic parameters of any system of criminal sanctions; if such fundamental
issues are closely linked to utilitarian concerns, how can von Hirsch
insist that punishment is still "essentially" or "primarily" a blaming
institution?
Morris further questions von Hirsch's arguments based on "fairness." Morris freely admits that his theory allows equally blameworthy
defendants to receive unequal degrees of severity and thus permits the
more blameworthy to receive less punishment. This much is implicit
in any system of broad, overlapping desert ranges (although Morris's
examples of overlapping ranges are for offenses of fairly similar severity-murder and manslaughter; rape and aggravated assault; Morris
1982, p. 151). But such "failures" of ordinal proportionality are not
necessarily either substantial in degree or routine, as von Hirsch asserts. Morris's principle of parsimony, combined with his recognition
of equality as an important guiding factor, are intended to result in
most defendants receiving punishment near the bottom of their desert
range; thus most sentences will be roughly proportionate to (ordinal)
desert.
More fundamentally, however, Morris questions von Hirsch's assumption that equality values trump all other concerns. Although
equality is an important goal of sentencing, few people believe it is the
only goal (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 86-87, 89). As discussed more
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fully in Section III below, Morris's assumptions about popular notions
of equality and "fairness" seem to be borne out, at least in Minnesota;
the people of that state have, for over fifteen years, accepted a guidelines sentencing system with much greater departures from ordinal desert than von Hirsch would allow. Different sentences for two offenders of equal blame are apparently seen as "fair," provided there are
good (nondesert) reasons for unequal treatment, and provided further
that the differences are not too great, or too often linked to bad reasons
(e.g., racial bias).
The latter problem is, of course, a very legitimate concern. Although
von Hirsch has not specifically accused Morris of promoting or tolerating invidious distinctions, Morris himself recognizes that a broader
sentencing range, with discretion to be selectively lenient, risks
allowing distinctions to be made along race and class lines. But he argues that if discretion is denied, to minimize the potential for bias, the
alternative in practice will often simply be to impose uniformly severe
penalties on all offenders, with no evidence that society or anyone else
is benefited (Morris 1982, pp. 158-59).
Morris could also easily defend his conception of desert, as allowing
substantial weight to be given to the defendant's criminal record. He
notes that criminal history is "the second most significant factor in defining the amount of punishment in all existing systems of criminal
punishment" and has a legitimate role for reasons of both crime control and desert (Morris 1982, pp. 162-63); it thus should be, and will
always be, a major factor. Other retributive theorists have also been
willing to give criminal history a greater role than does von Hirsch
(Bottoms 1995, p. 22, n. 17, citing Andrew Ashworth 1992).
Finally, Morris disagrees that sufficient parsimony can be provided
simply by lowering the anchoring points on the punishment scale.
Given the political pressures they face, legislators are very unlikely to
do this (Morris 1982, pp. 157-58), and beyond a certain point, neither
is an independent (but politically appointed) sentencing commission.
Thus power to grant case-level leniency, without strict desert and
equality constraints, is essential. Such power is particularly critical if,
as so often happens, the legislature also fails to provide enough prison
space and other resources to accommodate the scale it has enacted.
Moreover, case-level mitigations will continue to be granted by prosecutors through their charging and plea-bargaining discretion, evenindeed, especially-if such power is denied to judges (Morris 1982, p.
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158). Morris feels that this power is better shared with judges and
brought out in the open; if dealt with openly and honestly, principles
can be developed to provide guidance, and judges can be encouraged
to state reasons for their decisions. Morris has long been a foe of hypocrisy and secrecy and prefers an open and honest approach. As he
once said, in arguing to decriminalize "victimless" crimes, "what is required is better regulation ... it is impossible to regulate behavior that is
prohibited" (Morris and Hawkins 1977, p. 21; emphasis in original).
Another defect of von Hirsch's approach is that, given his strict "ordinal proportionality" requirements-including proportional spacing of
penalties-it is impossible for the legislature or sentencing commission
to lower penalties for less serious offenses (e.g., to stay within available
resources) without also lowering penalties for more serious offenses;
simply lowering the "low" end of the grid would change the spacing,
thus violating ordinal proportionality (or at least, whatever proportionality assessments underlay the original grid). Similarly, sentences could
not be raised for violent offenders, without raising the entire penalty
scale. Yet sentencing systems need to be able to respond to major
changes in the type or volume of crime and to give priority, in the
allocation of scarce resources, to more serious crimes. States should
not have to raise or lower the entire penalty scale to respond to these
needs. Von Hirsch would probably view such constraints as a "plus,"
assuming that the legislature, reluctant to raise the entire scale, would
keep all penalties low and "parsimonious." Morris would reply that a
far more likely scenario is to raise all penalties, with the expectation of
massive (but selective and inconsistent) mitigation of sanctions for less
serious offenders.
Morris would also insist that his theory would not, as von Hirsch
claims, lead to greater sentencing severity. Judges could not routinely
sentence close to the maximum of desert without violating Morris's
central principle of parsimony. Legislatures could, of course, unwisely
raise the maximum and/or minimum desert-range limits, just as they
could raise von Hirsch's cardinal "anchoring points." Whether they
would feel freer to do this in a system of broad ranges is speculative,
and cannot be answered in the abstract, for all jurisdictions (see Sec.
III below). It should also be recognized that if only the range maximums were raised, judges would remain free (and, under the parsimony principle, would be expected) to continue to sentence most cases
near the bottom end of the desert range.
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D. Summary
Von Hirsch and Morris appear to agree on several important points:
first, that the concept of desert is very important; second, that the preguidelines systems of "indeterminate sentencing" gave far too great a
role to offender-based rehabilitative and incapacitative goals; and third,
that parsimony is important-sentencing severity, and especially the
use of incarceration, are excessive in the United States.
However, von Hirsch and Morris disagree strongly on the details
of a system of desert-oriented sentences, designed to limit unjustified
disparity and promote parsimony. As frequently happens in such debates, the two writers often talk past each other because of their fundamentally different assumptions (Tonry 1994, pp. 77-79). Morris values, and wants to accommodate, a much broader range of sentencing
goals, and he is also very concerned with how well his proposed principles will be accepted (and consistently applied) in practice. Von Hirsch
is striving to create a logical and coherent sentencing theory, without
much regard for either the value of nondesert goals or how well his
theory accords with traditional practices. These two authors also seem
to have very different ideas of what is intuitively "fair." Of the two,
Morris would seem to be more attuned to what people actually think
is fair, at least in Minnesota.
III. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in Theory
and Practice9
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission adopted retribution (just deserts) as its primary sentencing goal (Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 9; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1984, pp. v, 10-14). However, the original 1980 version
of the guidelines also gave substantial emphasis to utilitarian goals,
which had strong legislative support. The role of nonretributive purposes has grown in the fifteen years since the guidelines became effective, but the changes have been gradual, and usually built on themes
that were clearly present in the original guidelines and enabling legislation. Just deserts continues to play a very important role in Minnesota sentencing, but its role is more accurately described as a "limiting" one: defining the maximum sentence severity in almost all cases
and, for the most serious cases (about one-fifth of the annual caseload),
specifying relatively flexible standards of minimum severity.
I An

earlier version of this section of the article appeared in Frase (1994).
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In this section of the essay, I first examine the Minnesota legislature's original intent regarding sentencing goals. I then present a brief
summary of how the guidelines work, describe how the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission carried out its statutory mandate,
and analyze the commission's original intent (including what it did, as
well as what it said it was doing). Finally, I discuss how punishment
theory under the guidelines has evolved over time, addressing the sentencing purposes implicit in appellate case law interpreting the guidelines, significant legislative and commission actions since 1980, and the
actual sentencing practices of trial judges and attorneys.
A. The OriginalLegislative Intent
The 1978 guidelines enabling statute (1978 Minn. Laws, chap. 723)
contained no explicit statement of sentencing theory and imposed relatively few specific mandates. The Minnesota legislature simply directed
the newly created commission to promulgate guidelines (regulating
both the decision to impose state imprisonment and the duration of
such imprisonment), based on "reasonable offense and offender characteristics," while taking into "substantial consideration" two factors:
"current sentencing and releasing practices" and "correctional resources, including but not limited to the capacities of local and state
correctional facilities." The commission was also permitted (but was
not required) to develop guidelines regulating the conditions of nonprison sentences.
The enabling statute abolished parole release discretion and substituted a limited reduction (up to one-third off the pronounced sentence) for good behavior in prison. This earned good-time reduction
then constitutes a period of parole-type postrelease supervision (the supervised release term). The statute also implied that denial of goodtime reductions could only be based on disciplinary violations, not failure to participate in or cooperate with in-prison treatment programs
(since all such programs were to become voluntary)."° Finally, the statute requires sentencing judges to provide written reasons when they
depart from the guidelines, and both defendants and the prosecution
are given the right to appeal any sentence (whether or not it is a departure).
It seems clear that a major purpose of the statute was to reduce sen-

10Since 1993, inmates may lose good-time credits if they refuse to work or participate
in treatment programs. See Sec. IIC2 below.
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tencing discretion, thus promoting greater uniformity of sentences, but
what broader purposes did the legislature want such sentences to
serve? Did it intend to move toward a "just-deserts" model, with
sharply reduced emphasis on rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence? The legislative preference for greater uniformity does not, by
itself, imply a strong emphasis on retributive values: reduced case-level
discretion limits the ability of courts to "fine-tune" their assessments
not only of each offender's treatment needs and dangerousness but also
of his or her precise deserts (Frase 1991b, p. 332).
Von Hirsch has argued that the Minnesota enabling statute "suggests no particular rationale" or choice between sentencing purposes
(von Hirsch 1987a, p. 65). However, on closer inspection it appears
that the legislature did take a position, albeit an imprecise one (Frase
1993b, pp. 347-49). First, the legislature left unchanged several references to utilitarian goals and offender-based sentencing, contained in
the state's criminal code. Second, the enabling statute directed the
guidelines commission to give "substantial consideration" to existing
sentencing and releasing practices, which suggests limited change in
preexisting norms and therefore substantial continued emphasis on the
utilitarian goals which had dominated preguidelines sentencing.
Of course, the statute did limit the pursuit of utilitarian goals (especially rehabilitation and incapacitation) in several ways: discretionary
parole release was abolished, and all prison treatment programs were
made voluntary. But the statute did not forbid consideration of the offender's treatment needs or dangerousness when determining whether to
impose a prison term, nor did it preclude the imposition of conditions
of probation or supervised release designed to promote rehabilitation or public safety. Thus although individualized parole-risk assessments and coerced "cure" in prison were both abandoned, probationrisk assessments and required treatment in the community were not
necessarily rejected."
Nor does the legislative history of the enabling statute evince an intent to emphasize retribution, abandon utilitarian goals, or dramatically change any existing sentencing norms. The 1978 act was the culmination of several years of legislative ferment over the sentencing
reform issue, reflecting increasing dissatisfaction with indeterminate
sentencing, but disagreement over what to do about it (Parent 1988,
" Goodstein (1983), p. 494, noting the early emergence of the practice of setting
mandatory treatment conditions of supervised release (the Minnesota guidelines "parole" term).
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pp. 21-27; Frase 1993b, pp. 347-49). Sentencing purposes were rarely
debated as such; whatever consensus there was at that time seemed to
focus on abolishing the parole board and increasing the uniformity of
sentences, while at the same time avoiding any overall increase in sentencing severity and prison populations.
It thus appears that the most probable legislative purposes in enacting the 1978 enabling statute were, first, to sharply limit judicial and
parole discretion in the pursuit of all of the traditional purposes of
punishment, without abandoning any of those purposes, or strongly
preferring some over others; second, to emphasize that state prison
sentences are imposed primarily to achieve retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation, and not to achieve forced rehabilitation (i.e., rehabilitation is to be pursued primarily outside of prison); third, to consider
other changes in sentencing policy, without departing too much from
existing practices; and, fourth, to recognize, while pursuing the goals
above, that punishment (especially prison) is expensive and that overcrowding of prisons and other resources must be avoided even if this
limits the achievement of certain punishment goals.
B. The Sentencing Commission's Original Intent-the Meaning of
"ModifiedJust Deserts" in Minnesota
Pursuant to the statutory mandate described above, the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission developed a set of guidelines in
the form of a two-dimensional matrix (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 30). The current grid, shown in figure 1,
was last revised in 1989 (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § IV). There are ten categories of increasing offense severity running down the vertical axis of the grid, and seven defendant
criminal history categories (from zero to six or more points) running
across the horizontal axis.
The numbers in each cell are presumptive prison durations, in
months. Offenders with low to medium criminal history scores, convicted of lower severity offenses, are recommended to receive probation, accompanied by a stayed (suspended) prison term of a specified
number of months; for more serious offenses or criminal history
scores, the recommended sentence is an executed prison term within a
narrow specified range (e.g., forty-four to fifty-two months, at severity
level 7, with zero criminal history).
The boundary between presumptive stayed and presumptive executed prison terms is shown on the grid by a heavy black line known
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FIG. 1.-Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines grid, effective August 1, 1989. Source:
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (1995b). Note: Presumptive sentence
lengths are in months. An asterisk (*) = one year and one day. Italicized numbers within
the grid range denote the range within which a judge may sentence without the sentence
being deemed a departure. Under state statutes, first-degree murder has a mandatory
life sentence.

as the "disposition line." Cases falling in cells above the line generally
receive presumptive probation sentences (a few cases above the line
have presumptive prison-commit sentences; most of the latter involve
repeat sex offenders or use of a dangerous weapon, which are subject
to mandatory minimum prison terms under state statutes).
Additional guidelines rules specify when consecutive prison sentences may be imposed; list permissible and impermissible bases for
departure from presumptive disposition, duration, and consecutivesentence rules; define a general departure standard ("substantial and
compelling circumstances"); and suggest (but do not regulate by presumptive rules) a wide variety of possible conditions of stayed prison
sentences. Such conditions may include up to one year of confinement
in a local jail, home detention, electronic monitoring, intensive probationary supervision, required appearances at a day-reporting center, inpatient or outpatient treatment, restitution, fines, community service,
or (with certain limitations, discussed below) any combination of the
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above conditions (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1995b, § IH.A.; Minn. Stat. Annot. § 609.135).12
1. The Sentencing Commission's Key Policy Choices. The commission
chose to adopt a "prescriptive" rather than a "descriptive" approach
to guidelines drafting (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1980, pp. 2-3; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984,
pp. v, 8-14). Thus the new guidelines were intended to change, not
simply model and perpetuate, past judicial and parole decisions. Although prior practices were taken into account, as required by the enabling statute, the commission made a number of independent decisions about which offenders ought to go to prison and for how long.
One of the commission's earliest prescriptive choices was its decision
to adopt just deserts as the "primary" sentencing goal under the guidelines (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984 pp. v, 1014), while giving limited scope to other sentencing purposes and
considerations-the theory of "modified just deserts" (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 9).
The theory needs further elaboration-how much is desert theory
"modified," and by what? Clearly, one important nondesert goal was
the incapacitation of high-risk offenders. The commission admitted
that this goal influenced the precise placement and slope of the disposition line (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 9),
and it appears that scaling of presumptive prison durations was also
influenced by considerations of incapacitation. The commission recognized that recidivists are more likely to reoffend,"3 and it adopted a grid
in which presumptive durations increase substantially, with increases
in the defendant's criminal history score. As a result, the impact of
criminal history under the guidelines goes well beyond the modest role
that von Hirsch would allow prior record to play.' 4
12The cited statute limits the duration of probationary jail sentences, defines the
available "intermediate sanctions," and encourages courts to impose such sanctions
"when practicable." The statute further provides that the duration of a stayed felony
sentence (and thus the length of probation) may be any period up to the maximum
prison term that could have been imposed, or four years, whichever is longer (Minn.
Stat. Annot. § 609.135, subd. 2[a]).
" The commission noted that the use of criminal history to increase sentences "has
an implicit incapacitative effect, since offenders with longer criminal histories tend to be
somewhat greater risks than those with lesser criminal histories. It may also provide an
implicit rehabilitative effect, since those with longer criminal histories often have more
severe problems and a longer period of control is thought necessary to deal with the
problems" (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984, p. 14).
14 See von Hirsch (1981a, pp. 619, 632) (defendants deserve full punishment after a
"modest" number of convictions; the effect of prior record on prison duration, under
the Minnesota guidelines, exceeds what can be justified on desert grounds alone); see
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The commission's implicit pursuit of incapacitative goals may also
be reflected in its decision to define "prior" convictions as of the date
of sentencing, rather than as of the date that the current offense was
committed. Some writers believe that crimes committed after the current offense have no bearing on "desert" (Parent 1988, p. 163); however, such crimes are quite relevant if the goal is to identify and incapacitate (or specifically deter) high-risk offenders. The inclusion, in the
criminal history scale, of a point for "custody status" (being on parole,
probation, in prison, etc., at the time of the current offense) may also
reflect selective incapacitation goals or considerations of specific deterrence.
The commission did not specifically address the goal of general deterrence, except to suggest that it would require a sentencing structure
very similar to a desert model (i.e., with more serious offenses assigned
the more severe penalties; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984, p. 12). Presumably, the greater uniformity of guidelines sentences also promotes the goal of general deterrence, by increasing the
"certainty" of punishment and decreasing would-be offenders' hopes
of leniency (Zimring and Hawkins 1973, pp. 160-72, 207).
Another very important prescriptive choice was the commission's
decision to strictly interpret the statutory mandate to consider correctional resources. The commission went further than the statute required and established a goal that state prison populations should never
exceed 95 percent of capacity; it then developed a detailed, computerized projection model to test the expected prison population that
would result from each proposed version of the guidelines (Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, pp. 2, 13-14). Resource
limitations affected both dispositional and durational decisions, especially the latter (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980,
p. 11).
The commission's other major prescriptive choices included the
rank ordering of offense severities; the construction of the criminal
history scale;"5 and the decision to adopt a disposition line that was
"flatter" (i.e., more "desert"-oriented) than would have been sugalso von Hirsch (1995, pp. 154-55, 157) (impact of criminal history on presumptive duration, as well as the steep "slope" of the disposition line, give far too much weight to
prior record).
15 The commission's original criminal history scale included one point for each prior
felony; up to one point for multiple prior misdemeanor convictions; up to one point for
serious juvenile record; and one point for "custody status." The commission subsequently adopted a "weighting" system for prior felonies (see Sec. IIIC4 below).
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gested by prior sentencing practices, thus sending more low-criminal
history "person" offenders to prison (especially those at severity levels
7 and 8), and fewer low-severity, high-criminal-history property offenders (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, pp. 215; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984, pp. 8-14). In
addition, the commission adopted a broad goal of sentencing "neutrality" relative to race, gender, and social or economic status (including
an explicit rejection of departures based on the offender's employment
status at the time of sentencing) (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1995b, §§ I(1), II.D.1). Finally, the commission endorsed
a principle similar to Morris's concept of "parsimony": to ensure that
prison and jail space is available for the most serious cases, sanctions
"should be the least restrictive necessary to achieve the purposes of
the sentence" (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b,
§ I[3]).
Most of the prescriptive policies mentioned above either reflect, or
are easily reconciled with, a just-deserts model. As noted in Section II
above, mitigation of sentences in order to stay within available resources is consistent with von Hirsch's theory, provided that all sentences are mitigated, without changing the relative severity among different offenses ("ordinal" desert) and provided further that the looser,
"cardinal" (absolute) limits of minimum desert are respected.
However, the "parsimony" principle is more problematic. Von
Hirsch would only allow such considerations to be used to lower the
entire punishment scale; selective, case-level reductions would violate
his principle of strict ordinal proportionality. The guidelines' reference
to "the purposes of the sentence" suggests consideration of multiple
punishment goals and the granting of case-level mitigation unrelated
to ordinal desert. The endorsement of case-specific parsimony implies
that the commission, like Morris, viewed desert as permitting a range
of permissible sanctions; within that range, courts may also consider
nonretributive purposes and should impose the lowest penalty which
adequately serves all relevant purposes.
The "range" theory above finds further support in the structure and
foreseeable application of the guidelines. The Minnesota commission
knew that, in the great majority of cases under the new guidelines,
judges would retain a wide variety of sentencing options and would
continue to apply utilitarian goals and make offender-specific assessments. Under the guidelines, about three-quarters of defendants have
presumptive stayed prison sentences (Frase 1993a, p. 299), and the

396

Richard S. Frase

commission projected that about 80 percent of defendants would actually receive a stayed sentence. 6 No minimum "deserved" sentence is
specified for presumptive stayed prison cases. However, the guidelines
do set upper (maximum) limits on sentence severity in these cases, by
means of the presumptive disposition (no immediate prison commitment) and the presumptive duration which applies if an aggravated dispositional departure is ordered, or if the initial stay of prison is later
revoked. But the guidelines recommend and assume that departures
and revocations will be exceptional. In the absence of departure or revocation, the guidelines do not specify any particular sentence for these
defendants. Under Minnesota sentencing laws, such defendants may
receive a sentence as light as unsupervised probation or as heavy as a
twelve-month jail term (which may also be combined with treatment
requirements, strict probation, and other conditions).
Moreover, the guidelines explicitly state that the proper penal objectives to be considered in establishing the conditions of stayed sentences
include "retribution, rehabilitation, public protection, restitution, deterrence, and public condemnation of criminal conduct" (Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 35; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § III.A.2). The guidelines further
provide that "the relative importance of these objectives may vary with
both offense and offender characteristics" and that "multiple objectives
may be present in any given sentence."
Thus for at least three-quarters of defendants, the guidelines essentially retain the traditional, offender-based indeterminate sentencing
system, with no minimum severity requirements, and with all sentencing purposes allowed. However, maximum prison severity is limited by
the presumptive disposition and stayed prison term. The nature and
severity of stay conditions was not specifically limited under the original guidelines, but the commission may have expected the principle of
parsimony to encourage moderation and attention to the actual need
for each additional proposed condition of probation.
Von Hirsch has objected to the "range" theory suggested above. He
maintains that the commission was not trying to "systematically" regu-

"The projected prison commitment rate for male felons was 20.7 percent and for
females, 9.2 percent (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 15). Due
to a variety of transitional effects, the actual prison rate (for both sexes combined) was
only 15 percent in the first year of the guidelines, but the rate has hovered around 20
percent ever since (Frase 1993a, p. 331, table 14; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1995a, p. 17).
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late the sentences in stayed prison cases but was merely "setting forth
a maximum applicable to the worst cases," while trying to limit the
impact such cases would have on prison populations (von Hirsch 1995,
p. 161). It may well be that the commission originally intended its presumptive stay rules as a temporary stopgap and fully intended to later
develop more precise, desert-based rules for stay conditions. But the
commission's clear endorsement of utilitarian sentencing goals in stay
cases strongly suggests that the commission viewed stayed sentences as
serving different purposes than prison terms and that it was not planning to develop a strongly desert-centered model for stayed sentences.
Nor did the commission subsequently attempt to impose any such
model. In the absence of guidance from the commission, the Minnesota Supreme Court began to develop a utilitarian, offender-based theory of stayed sentences and dispositional departures; the court also interpreted the commission's stayed prison durations as limiting not just
the prison terms for cases of dispositional departure or stay revocation
but also the maximum ordinarily deserved severity of probation sanctions in each guidelines cell above the disposition line.
As for the minority of defendants with presumptive executed prison
terms, the commission adopted very narrow presumptive sentence
ranges, which suggests a much stronger emphasis on (modified) just
deserts. But here, too, the commission's rules do not strictly control
minimum sanction severity, and the commission must have expected
that utilitarian sentencing purposes would continue to play an important role in mitigating sentences. The guidelines imposed no limits at
all on charging and plea-bargaining concessions, which can easily be
used to mitigate presumptive prison terms. The commission must have
expected that prosecutors and judges would continue to consider
offender-based, utilitarian sentencing goals in deciding to grant or
deny such concession (and it appears that they have done so; see Sec.
111C3 below). Nor did the commission explicitly forbid courts from basing departures on nonretributive grounds. Although the commission's
lists of allowable departure factors are mostly desert-related, these lists
are expressly not exclusive (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § lI.D.2). Given the pervasive practice of plea bargaining
related to offender as well as offense factors, and the open-ended lists
of permissible factors, it could be expected that many departures-especially mitigations-would continue to be based on nonretributive
grounds.
Perhaps the commission intended to take up these issues later and
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close the theoretical "loopholes" described above. But it never announced such an intention, nor did it ever even begin to consider these
issues; in the absence of commission action or guidance, courts and
attorneys quite reasonably assumed that the commission tacitly accepted the legitimacy of a more flexible, multipurpose model of sentencing.
C. The Evolution of Sentencing Theory since 1980
The rough outlines of a limiting retributive theory, suggested by the
enabling statute and the original version of the guidelines, have become much clearer since 1980. Important contributions to this evolution were made by appellate case law, legislative enactments, the actual
practices of judges and attorneys, and some of the commission's own
proposed amendments.
1. Major Theory-Related Guidelines Case Law. The appeal rights
granted to defendants and prosecutors under the guidelines have generated a rich body of appellate case law, fully realizing Morris's ideal
of an evolving "common law of sentencing."
The Minnesota Supreme Court almost immediately established the
principle that sentence enhancement must generally be based on aggravated circumstances of the conviction offense and may not be based
on the details of offenses dismissed or never filed (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984, pp. 111-13)." The court also established that durational departures may not be based on assessments of
the individual defendant's dangerousness (State v. Hagen, 317 N.W.2d
701, 703 [Minn. 1982]) nor on special needs for deterrence (State v.
Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56, 58, n. 1 [Minn. 1983]) or for extended, inprison treatment (State v. Barnes, 313 N.W.2d 1 [Minn. 1981]). In
State v. Evans (311 N.W.2d 481 [Minn. 1981]), the court ruled that
upward durational departures should normally not exceed twice the
presumptive duration (although in "rare," exceptionally aggravated
cases, the trial court may depart all the way up to the statutory maximum). Uniformity goals were further strengthened by the court's early
announcement that trial court decisions not to depart will rarely warrant reversal on appeal (State v. Kandem, 313 N.W.2d 6 [Minn. 1981]).
7 However, some presumptive sentences are determined by factors (e.g., dollar
amount of loss) which need not be proven as an element of the conviction offense; moreover, most upward departures are based on nonelemental facts (e.g., unusual cruelty to
the victim), and a few involve facts which are not even part of the same course of conduct
(e.g., "major economic offense" by defendant involved in other similar conduct) (Frase
1993a, p. 288, n. 29; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § II.D.2.b).
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In State v. Randolph (316 N.W.2d 508 [Minn. 1982]), the court held
that the trial judge must grant a defendant's request for execution of
the presumptive stayed prison term whenever the judge's proposed
conditions of a stayed sentence are so onerous that they would, in the
aggregate, be more severe than that prison term. This case, in effect,
limits maximum sanction severity in stayed prison cases and thus reinforces and extends the commission's implicit policy of setting upper
(but not lower) limits on sanction severity in these cases.
In State v. Hernandez (311 N.W.2d 478 [Minn. 1981]), the court
held that criminal history points may accrue on a single day when defendants are sentenced concurrently for multiple offenses. Thus a defendant with no previous convictions who was sentenced concurrently
on four separate felonies (one point each) would have a criminal history of three when he was sentenced on the fourth count. Prior to Hernandez, prosecutors could serialize prosecutions to achieve the same
result, and all additional concurrent counts would increase the defendant's future criminal history if he committed further offenses,
but Hernandez increases the immediate impact (and plea-bargaining leverage) of multiple counts. The Hernandez rule also helps prosecutors
target "high-rate" offenders and thus further emphasizes the utilitarian
(incapacitative) purposes which were already implicit in the commission's criminal history scale (in particular: the inclusion of convictions
as of the date of sentencing, rather than as of the date of the current
offense, and the substantial weight given to criminal history in determining the presumptive disposition and duration).
In another very significant line of cases, the court held that dispositional departures (but not durational departures) may be based on individualized assessments of the offender's "amenability" to probation or
prison."8 In State v. Park (305 N.W.2d 775 [Minn. 1981]), the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld an upward dispositional departure (i.e.,
commitment to prison, rather than the presumptive stayed term) because of the defendant's unamenability to probation. The latter finding
was based on the defendant's serious chemical dependency problem,
his refusal to accept that he had a problem or needed treatment, and
his complete failure to cooperate during previous probation terms.
In later cases, the supreme court applied several other "amenability"
concepts to uphold downward dispositional departures (i.e., granting
"8These cases are discussed at length in Frase (1991a, pp. 740-48). A similar line of
cases, under the federal sentencing guidelines, is discussed in Frase (1991b).
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probation-usually accompanied by a short jail term and/or required
residential treatment-in lieu of the presumptive executed prison
term). In State v. Wright (310 N.W.2d 461 [Minn. 1981]), the departure was based on two independent grounds. First, the court found that
the defendant was unusually vulnerable, and was therefore unamenable
to prison, because his extreme immaturity would cause him to be victimized or led into criminal activity by other inmates. Second, the
court found that the defendant was particularly amenable to treatment
in a probationary setting; he needed psychiatric care unavailable in
prison and would not endanger public safety provided he received appropriate outpatient treatment.
In State v. Trog (323 N.W.2d 28 [Minn. 1982]), the court upheld a
downward dispositional departure based solely on the defendant's particular amenability to probation. The presentence report indicated
that, prior to the current offense (burglary with assault) Trog had been
an "outstanding citizen," with no police record of any kind, even as a
juvenile; he had also done well in school and at work, was intoxicated
at the time of the offense, had cooperated fully with the police, and
was shaken and extremely contrite about the incident. The departure
in this case appears to be based on the aberrational and uncharacteristic nature of the defendant's crime, rather than on any particular treatment needs. The supreme court also quoted with approval the testimony of a retired chief of the police juvenile division, that nothing
would be served by sending Trog to prison. This case provides a clear
example of the rejection of strict, desert-based lower limits on punishment; Trog's sentence was mitigated for reasons of utilitarian "parsimony"-greater severity would serve no social purpose and might
even be harmful.
Of all the theory-related decisions described above, the "amenability" case law seems most out of character with the dominant "justdeserts" theory of the guidelines. The supreme court has never explained why it limited this doctrine to "dispositional" departures (stay
or execution of prison) or how amenability departures relate to the
structure and purposes of the guidelines. However, as I have argued at
greater length elsewhere (Frase 1991a, pp. 740-48), a closer analysis
of the amenability cases reveals that they are quite consistent with the
guidelines and are supported by strong practical and policy considerations. The following is a summary of the main points of that argument.
First, as noted in Section IIIB above, the guidelines strongly imply
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that stayed sentences serve different and broader purposes than prison
terms. The guidelines also state that dispositional and durational departures are separate decisions, requiring separate justification (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, comment ll.D.02),
and the guidelines do not limit either type of departure to retributive
grounds.' 9 The supreme court's amenability cases reconcile these policies by treating dispositional presumptions and departures as primarily
offender-based, 2° whereas durational presumptions and departures are
entirely offense- and culpability-based (State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d
243, 244 [Minn. 1983]).
Second, the offender-based disposition theory above finds support
in the manner in which the guidelines regulate stayed sentences.
Judges are given broad discretion not only to base stay conditions and
severity on nonretributive grounds but also to revoke stayed sentences
based on technical violations and other indicia of "unamenability" to
probation. Such revocations are difficult to reconcile with a theory that
assumes that probation was all the defendant deserved, and will ever
deserve, for the original offense (Parent 1988, p. 231; von Hirsch,
Wasik, and Greene 1989, p. 609). The simplest answer to this retributive anomaly is that such a defendant did deserve the presumptive
prison term provided for his original offense and prior record (for further discussion of this, see Sec. IVA below) but was initially given less
in an attempt to achieve the utilitarian purposes of probation (rehabilitation, restitution or community service, and "parsimony"). Any subsequent revocation is justified not only by the need to deter probation
violations but also by acts of the defendant that suggest that he is unamenable to probation and should now be given his full (modified) deserts. But why did we think that such a defendant was "amenable" in
the first place? The answer must be: because he was presumed to be
amenable, given his less serious offense and prior record. From this
theory, it was a short step to conclude that, in exceptional cases, judges
may decide at the outset that the presumption of amenability has been
overcome, thus justifying an aggravated dispositional departure. Such
departures, like stay revocations, reflect a theory of "limiting" retribu1"The commission has expressed concern that amenability departures may permit
race and class bias but has declined to forbid them (see Sec. IVC4 below).
" Although dispositional departures are generally offender-based, courts may, and occasionally do, depart dispositionally for reasons related solely to culpability. See, e.g.,
State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982) (mitigated departure) and State v. Gartland,
330 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1983) (aggravated departure).
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tivism: retributive values determine the maximum deserved punishment (prison duration), while utilitarian goals (along with considerations of parsimony and uniformity) determine initial and subsequent
disposition decisions.
Third, a similar theory explains mitigating amenability departures in
presumptive commit cases: such offenders are normally presumed to
be unamenable to probation, but this presumption, too, may be overcome in exceptional cases.
Fourth, since there are no guidelines or other legal controls over
stay revocations, charging, and plea bargaining, judges and prosecutors
could and probably did achieve similar results without the use of aggravating and mitigating "amenability" departures. Formal recognition of
such departures merely encourages courts and prosecutors to make
these decisions openly, stating reasons. Open decision making is consistent with the "truth-in-sentencing" theme of the guidelines (Frase
1993a, p. 281) and permits adversary argument, appellate review, and
commission guidance, rather than subterfuge and evasion. The latter dangers would be particularly great in such a heavily treatmentoriented state (Frase 1993a, p. 334); Minnesota, "the land of 10,000
lakes," is also sometimes called "the land of 10,000 treatment centers."
Fifth, given the ease with which the same results can be achieved
informally, formal recognition of amenability departures does not significantly add to sentencing disparity or undercut the deterrent value
of presumptive prison terms. In practice, amenability departures are
limited to exceptional cases and do not appear to be granted in a racially discriminatory manner.21 It can also be argued that individualized
amenability assessments are sufficiently reliable, provided they are limited to fairly clear-cut (i.e., exceptional) cases. Indeed, even von Hirsch
seems to accept occasional dispositional departures for "amenable" or
"responsive" individuals (von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene 1989, pp.
606, 614).
Sixth, amenability departures help to conserve scarce correctional
resources. Probation services are not wasted on clearly unamenable offenders (nor are the latter likely to be made much worse if sent to
prison). Amenable offenders can be effectively treated in the community, often at lower cost, while avoiding harmful prison influences,
2 See Frase 1993a, pp. 326-28 (mitigated amenability departures occur in about 15
percent of presumptive prison-commit cases; aggravated amenability departures occur in
less than 1 percent of cases with presumptive stayed prison terms).
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conserving prison beds for dangerous offenders and promoting parsimony.
Seventh, all three of the leading amenability decisions summarized
previously (Park, Wright, and Trog) were joined by the two former
members of the guidelines commission, Justices George Scott and
Douglas Amdahl, and the Trog opinion was written by Amdahl (who
also wrote many other leading guidelines opinions, including Randolph
and Hernandez). Thus at least two of the original nine drafters of the
guidelines saw no fundamental conflict between amenability concepts
and the commission's "original intent."
2. Legislative Developments Related to Sentencing Theory. As noted
earlier, the legislature which enacted the 1978 guidelines enabling statute wanted sentencing to become more uniform, with prison duration
no longer based on individualized treatment or parole-risk assessments; at the same time, the legislature also remained committed to
the pursuit of crime-control goals and sound fiscal and prison management.
Subsequent legislation has reinforced the importance of crime-control goals. Numerous laws have been enacted permitting judges to
make individualized assessments of offender dangerousness22 or amenability to treatment, for certain, narrowly defined groups of offenders
(Frase 1993b, pp. 356-57, 360-63). The legislature has also enacted
additional crime-control-motivated mandatory minimum statutes
(Frase 1993b, pp. 356, 360, 363). In 1989, the legislature amended the
guidelines enabling statute to specify that the commission's "primary"
consideration in drafting guidelines should be "public safety." In 1993,
the enabling statute was further amended to provide that violations
of prison "disciplinary" rules (which form the basis for loss of goodtime credits) may include "refusal to work" and "refusal to participate
in treatment or other rehabilitative programs" (Minn. Stat. Annot.
§ 244.05, subd. lb[b]).
3. Sentencing Theories Implicit in Guidelines Practices. Empirical
analysis of charging and sentencing practices under the guidelines suggests that attorneys and trial courts remain firmly attached to offenderbased, crime-control-oriented sentencing goals (Frase 1993a, pp. 29522In 1994, the legislature enacted a civil commitment statute for "sexually dangerous
persons" (Minn. Stat. Annot. §§ 253B.02, subd. 18b and 253B.185). This new law,
as well as an older statute covering "psychopathic personalities" (Minn. Stat. Annot.
§§ 253B.02, subd. 18a and 253B.185), are being applied with increasing frequency
to chronic sexual offenders who are nearing the end of their prison sentences.
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328). Prosecutors have used their charging discretion to avoid presumptive and mandatory-minimum prison terms, especially for highseverity-level "person" offenders with very low criminal history scores
and for low-severity-level weapons offenders (who are subject to presumptive prison sentences even if their cases fall above the disposition
line). Prosecutors have also used their charging and plea negotiation
powers to steadily increase the average criminal history scores of property offenders. By filing or retaining additional counts, prosecutors can
push low-severity recidivists across the grid, thus increasing their presumptive prison duration and making more of them eligible for presumptive prison-commit sentences.
As for judicial decisions, departure rates have gradually increased,
with mitigating departures far outweighing aggravated departures in all
years (Frase 1993a, pp. 296-328; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1995a, pp. 35, 37, 42). Aggravated, "unamenable-to-probation" departures remain extremely rare, but mitigated, "amenableto-probation" departures are granted in about 15 percent of presumptive prison cases (and account for about half of all mitigated
dispositional departures). Multiple regression analysis of mitigated and
aggravated dispositional departures and of the imposition of jail as a
condition of probation reveals that criminal history factors-especially
"custody status" (probation, parole, etc., at the time of the current offense)-are consistently among the strongest predictive factors, usually
much stronger than offense severity or offense type. Method of disposition (guilty plea vs. trial) is also usually a strong predictor of sentence
severity, among otherwise comparable cases, but race is generally not a
significant independent explanatory factor. Analysis of the limited data
available on demographic variables indicates that offender employment
continues, as it was before the guidelines, to be a significant predictor
of a noncustodial sentence (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1991, pp. 15-18; Dailey 1993, p. 774)-even though the
guidelines have always listed this as an impermissible departure factor
(Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § II.D.1).
The high rates of sentence mitigation, via charge reduction or formal departure, suggest once again that the guidelines have been much
less successful in setting lower limits on sanction severity than in setting upper limits. The strong influence of prior record (even beyond its
formal role in determining the presumptive disposition and duration),
together with the important role of the offender's employment status
and "amenability" to probation, result in a system in which both the
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form and the severity of sanctions are often determined by utilitarian,
offender-based assessments, rather than by considerations of desert.
These findings are consistent with Morris's limiting retributivism theory, in which desert (as measured by conviction offense and prior record) sets strict upper limits on sanction severity, but where many offenders receive lesser penalties whose precise severity is determined
primarily by nonretributive considerations (crime control, resource
limits, and "parsimony").
4. Important Commission-Initiated Amendments. The commission
has made many changes in the guidelines since 1980. Most are consistent with its original, modified deserts approach (e.g., the decision in
1989 to weight prior felony convictions according to their guidelines
severity level ranking; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1995b, § IL.B.1). However, the commission's occasional modifications
of the presumptive prison durations in certain grid cells are harder to
justify, since they violate the important concept of "ordinal" proportionality (relative severity of sanctions, among different offenses and
offenders; see Sec. 11A above). Reductions in certain durations at low
severity with medium-to-high criminal history were motivated by a
need to avoid expected prison overcrowding (Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1984, p. 92), rather than by any decision that
the prior durations exceeded ordinal desert. On several occasions (especially in 1989), presumptive durations for violent offenses were substantially increased. Although some commissioners may have felt that
these durations had always been too low, the principle motivating factor behind these changes was political pressure to respond to increased
rates of drug and violent crime (Frase 1993b, pp. 359-61).
The commission has never seriously addressed any of the guidelines
ambiguities or omissions that have allowed courts and attorneys to
continue to strongly pursue nondesert goals. Thus no attempt has been
made to regulate charging and plea-bargaining mitigations, stay revocations, or stay conditions, nor has the commission made any major
attempt to clarify what theories of punishment may be considered as
grounds for departure.
The commission has on several occasions considered the possibility
of enacting stay guidelines (most recently in 1988-89, pursuant to a
legislative directive to consider the issue). Each time, the commission
backed away from recommending any specific guidelines. This was
partly for practical reasons, in particular, local resource limits and massive field resistance. But it was also because there was a lack of commis-
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sion consensus on the primary sentencing goals to be served in stay
cases (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1989, pp. 20,
35).
In 1989, the commission added two sentences to the guidelines commentary (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, Comment II.D.101), requiring the trial court to demonstrate that an amenability departure is not based on impermissible social or economic
factors. But the commission expressly declined to forbid all amenability
departures and did not otherwise change or clarify the guidelines departure standards or lists of permissible and impermissible departure
standards.
D. Summary
The Minnesota guidelines were, from the outset, a very "modified"
version of just deserts and have become even more so over time. Although the original guidelines emphasized just deserts, they also retained a major role for nonretributive sentencing goals. First, the
strong influence of criminal history, in determining presumptive dispositions and durations, tests the limits of even the broadest conceptions of "desert" and clearly exceeds the role which von Hirsch finds
acceptable. Second, although presumptive disposition and duration
rules set fairly strict "modified desert" limits on maximum sanction severity, they impose no limits on minimum severity in presumptive stay
cases and (because charging discretion is not controlled) set rather
weak lower limits in presumptive commit cases. Third, utilitarian sentencing purposes are explicitly endorsed in the determination of stay
conditions and are not precluded as factors in charging, plea bargaining, or decisions to revoke a stayed sentence; utilitarian purposes
are also implicit in the guidelines' endorsement of case-specific "parsimony."
Postimplementation legislation and appellate case law have each reinforced the importance of nonretributive goals. Case law has increased the importance of criminal history and has given formal recognition to dispositional departures based on the offender-based,
nonretributive concept of "amenability" to prison or probation. Statutes have also endorsed the concept of amenability, while encouraging
courts and the commission to promote public safety (especially by increasing sentence severity for dangerous offenders).
Analysis of sentencing practices under the guidelines confirms the
strong continuing influence of utilitarian sentencing goals, especially

Sentencing Principles

rehabilitation, incapacitation, and the need to make efficient use of
limited correctional resources. Minnesota has been especially successful in avoiding prison overcrowding and promoting the parsimonious
use of prison sentences (Frase 1993a, pp. 329-33). Minnesota's percapita prison population remains lower than any other state with a major metropolitan area-only North Dakota has a lower rate (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1995, p. 3, table 2). Moreover, the increases in Minnesota's prison population since 1980 have primarily been due to increased felony caseloads (Frase 1995a, p. 194, fig. 7.6). During the
same time period, of course, other states and the federal system experienced dramatic increases in sentencing severity and inmate populations, and these increases do not appear to be explained by rising crime
rates (Frase 1995a, p. 194, fig. 7.7 and accompanying text).23
Nor has Minnesota's parsimonious use of prison sentences resulted
in escalating crime rates. The major increases in rates of reported
crimes, arrests, and felony caseloads in Minnesota, since the guidelines
became effective, have involved violent and drug offenses; index property crime rates have actually fallen by about 11 percent (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1981, p. 52; Federal Bureau of Investigation 1994,
p. 72; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995a, p. 49).
But, compared with other states, Minnesota sentences are relatively severe for drug and violent crimes (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1992, p. 1; Frase 1993c, pp. 28-32); "parsimony" has
been achieved through community-based sentencing of property offenders.
Minnesota's experience thus lends support to Morris's view that the
severity of criminal penalties has very little effect on overall crime rates
(Morris 1977b, pp. 267-69; Morris 1993, p. 309). In line with Morris's
strong endorsement of the principle of parsimony, Minnesota's experience further suggests that other states could substantially reduce their
overall rates of incarceration, with no loss in crime-control effectiveness, and at great savings in public expense and private hardship.
IV. Limiting Retributivism and Minnesota
Sentencing Policies
There are numerous similarities between the theory of punishment
that has evolved under the Minnesota guidelines and Morris's theory
11In the absence of comparable data on criminal caseloads, the best available base for
cross-jurisdictional comparisons of prison populations is adult arrests, weighted according to the seriousness of the offens6. In the cited study, arrests for violent crimes
were weighted (multiplied) by a factor of ten. Total inmate populations (prison plus jail)
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of limiting retributivism. The similarities are particularly strong when
sentencing practices in Minnesota are examined.
"But"-as Morris likes to say-there are a number of differences.
And yet on closer inspection, many of these differences are either minor shifts in emphasis or degree or else reflect practical considerations
of the kind that Morris has often noted and to which he would certainly be sympathetic.
In the following discussion of major similarities and differences, I
often refer for convenience simply to "Morris" and "Minnesota." But
as shown in Section III above, Minnesotans do not always speak with
a single voice on these matters; thus I occasionally note the differing
views or emphasis that appear in the guidelines commission's theoretical pronouncements and aspirations, in the guidelines themselves, in
occasionally discordant state statutes, in guidelines case law, and in actual practices.
A. Desert Limits
Both Morris and Minnesota recognize fairly strict, desert-based limits on maximum sanction severity, with relatively weak limits on minimum severity (or none at all). Both base their assessments of desert on
the offender's current conviction offense and prior record, and both
give substantial weight to prior record.
1. Upper Limits on Sanction Severity. For Morris, the upper limits
of desert may not be exceeded for any reason. Minnesota comes close
to, but does not quite achieve, this humane and principled constraint.
DurationalRules. The guidelines presumptive prison durations define the ordinary maximum of desert. Guidelines departure rules, together with appellate case law, further provide that these upper durational limits may only be exceeded for reasons of case-specific desert,
on a showing of "substantial and compelling circumstances" demonstrating aggravated culpability or harm. Only in rare, exceptionally aggravated cases may an upward durational departure exceed twice the
presumptive duration (in which case, the statutory maximum becomes
the upper limit).
"But"-various "dangerous offender" statutes enacted in 1989 and
1992 permit or even require aggravated durational departure, imposiat year end were analyzed as a percent of weighted adult arrests for that calendar year.
The arrest-based incarceration rates for Minnesota and for the United States as a whole
were very similar, from 1975 through 1980. But from 1981 through 1991, Minnesota
incarceration rates remained constant, while the U.S. rate increased by 80 percent.
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tion of the maximum statutory term, or use of extended maximum
terms for certain offenders (Frase 1993b, pp. 356-57, 360-63). Such
statutes appear to permit sentences in excess of maximum desert (as
measured by guidelines on presumptive durations and departure rules).
However, these statutes are narrowly drafted and thus infrequently
used. Furthermore, it appears likely that adoption of such statutes in
1989 was the political "price" for not enacting a death penalty or
broader increases in sentencing severity (Frase 1993b, pp. 359-60). In
light of the extreme political pressure to respond to increased rates of
violent and drug crime, adherence to von Hirsch's more rigid model
of "ordinal" desert might very well have resulted in elevation of the
entire sentencing scale, thus increasing overall severity (and probably
also increasing formal and informal [charge-induced] departure rates,
thereby decreasing uniformity and race and class neutrality). Nevertheless, such selective, seemingly undeserved sentence enhancements are
very troubling to Morris, who questions whether it is proper to "deal
unjustly with a few so that we can persuade the legislature to deal more
effectively and fairly with the many" (Morris 1974, p. 65).
Moreover, adoption of these special, sentence-enhancement statutes
did not prevent the legislature and the commission, in 1989, from also
substantially raising presumptive durations for offenders at severity
levels 7-10. For example, the presumptive durations for defendants at
these four levels, with zero criminal history, were raised from 24, 43,
105, and 216 months,24 respectively, to 48, 86, 150, and 306 months.
(Curiously, the greatest proportionate increases were for offenders
with the lowest criminal history scores.) These increases were primarily motivated by rising crime rates and public fear, rather than any reevaluation of ordinal desert.
If they were not so large, the durational increases described above
might be consistent with Morris's theory, since he viewed crime rates
and the public's fear of crime as relevant factors in the determination
of maximum desert. Even if Morris would reject such substantial increases on desert grounds, he might-despite his concerns about injustice to the "few"-concede that political realities sometimes create
hard choices for policy makers, with no clear "right" answer. And he
would certainly appreciate Minnesota's continued success, even after
1989, in limiting the use of prison sentences. The overall pattern of
" Presumptive sentences at levels 9 and 10 had already been raised once; prior to
1983, the durations at these severity levels (for defendants with zero criminal history)
were 97 and 116 months, respectively.
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Minnesota sentencing remains closer to Morris's model of custodial
"parsimony" and community-based corrections than any other American jurisdiction.
The sentencing guidelines commission has also lowered some of its
presumptive durations, to avoid prison overcrowding. Thus in 1983,
the commission lowered the durations at severity levels 1-3, for offenders with criminal history scores of 2 or greater. Such reductions
are quite easy to justify under Morris's flexible theory of desert (especially regarding lower or minimum desert requirements) but are inconsistent with von Hirsch's strict requirements for ordinal spacing of
penalties. Under von Hirsch's theory, Minnesota's choices would have
been to lower all penalties, build more prisons (if that could be done
in time), or do as most states have done: operate overcrowded prisons.
DispositionalRules. Under the guidelines, presumptive stayed prison
terms may be revoked if the defendant violates probation and, very exceptionally, may be executed ab initio if the offender is found unamenable to probation. Such probation revocations and "upward" dispositional departures do not require a case-specific finding of increased
desert. However, these practices are still consistent with a recognition
of strict upper desert limits-provided that one views a prison term,
equal in length to the presumptive stayed term, as the offender's maximum desert (Frase 1991a, pp. 742-47).
Support for the latter view is found in the commission's own work,
as well as in guidelines case law. The commission views its guidelines
as strongly desert-based, yet it has never required stay revocations and
upward dispositional departures to be based on findings of increased
desert. This implies that the presumptive durations of prison specified
for stay cases are already presumed to be "deserved" but that most offenders are recommended to initially receive less than their full deserts.
The apparent reasons for this leniency are to achieve parsimony and
to permit judges to consider a variety of nondesert purposes (the
guidelines explicitly authorize courts to consider such purposes, in determining the conditions of stayed sentences). The Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly accepted this "already deserved" theory when
it held that dispositional departures may be based on defendant "unamenability to probation," with no showing of increased culpability
(State v. Park, 305 N.W.2d 775 [Minn. 1981]). In contrast, all upward
durational departures require a showing of increased culpability and
may not be based on "unamenability" (State v. Jackson, 329 N.W.2d
66 [Minn. 1983]).
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Furthermore, the structure of presumptive sentence durations on
the guidelines grid strongly suggests a direct link between stay durations and desert. As shown in the current grid in figure 1, these durations increase smoothly and proportionately across each row within
each severity level, with no noticeable "break" at the disposition line.
Durations also increase fairly steadily within each column of the grid,
and this was even more true in the commission's original, 1980 grid.2
The largest cell-to-cell jumps in presumptive duration correspond to
severity level and criminal history increases, rather than to the location
of the disposition line. The supreme court evidently agreed that stay
durations measure maximum desert, when it decided that defendants
may demand execution of the presumptive stayed term if proposed stay
conditions are, in the aggregate, more onerous than such a term would
be (State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508 [Minn. 1982]).
As noted in Section III above, von Hirsch has objected to the above
theory, arguing that the commission was not trying to "systematically"
regulate sentences in stayed prison cases but was merely setting forth
a maximum applicable to the worst (i.e., most culpable) cases. But von
Hirsch's "worst offenders" theory does not fit the pattern of presumptive durations on the Minnesota guidelines grid. His theory implies
that these durational numbers mean very different things on either side
of the disposition line-"aggravated culpability" durations above the
line and "ordinary culpability" durations below. Yet, the durational
numbers generally increase smoothly across and down the grid and
show no systematic shifts across the disposition line. If anything, the
increases in presumptive durations accelerate, rather than pause or slow
down, as one crosses the disposition line from the supposed zone of
"aggravated" culpability durations to the zone of "ordinary" culpability durations.
Von Hirsch has also objected that the "already deserved" theory
above would permit courts routinely to sentence minor offenders to
prison (von Hirsch 1994, p. 45). However, this should not occur frequently under Minnesota's theory, nor has it occurred in practice;
Minnesota's emphasis on uniformity, combined with the goal of parsimony, yields a very strong presumption in favor of the recommended
stayed sentence and discourages probation revocation. In practice, upward dispositional departures are very rare (Frase 1993a, p. 326), and
,5 In 1980, the presumptive durations in the first three columns at severity level 6 were
(and remain today) twenty-one, twenty-six, and thirty months. At level 7 the durations
were twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-one months.
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probation revocation rates have also been modest in most years (Frase
1993d, p. 10).
2. Lower Limits on Sanction Severity. In Minnesota, as under Morris's theory, lower desert limits are often not present and, when present, are much more flexible than the upper limits described above. In
presumptive stay cases (over 75 percent of the caseload), the guidelines
impose no requirements of minimum sanction severity.26
As for presumptive prison-commit cases, the guidelines do prescribe
minimum severity limits (i.e., the low end of the range of presumptive
prison terms in each grid cell). However, these formal limits are often
avoided by means of departures and charging mitigations. The mitigated dispositional departure rate for these cases has varied between
19 and 34 percent (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
1995a, p. 37). If de facto departures achieved by charging leniency are
included, the mitigated dispositional departure rate is over 40 percent
(Frase 1993a, p. 302, table 1).
Finally, consistent with Morris's views, Minnesota statutes impose
relatively few mandatory-minimum prison terms or probation exclusions. Moreover, the two most frequently applicable "mandatory"
minimum statutes actually contain provisions allowing for the grant of
probation under certain circumstances (Minn. Stat. Annot. § 609.11,
subd. 8 [certain offenses committed with a firearm or other dangerous
weapon]; Minn. Stat. Annot. § 609.342, subd. 2 [sex-offense recidivists]). In practice, probation is very frequently granted in these two
groups of cases, especially for defendants whose cases fall above the
disposition line (Frase 1993a, p. 309).
3. Width of Ranges, between Maximum and Minimum Desert. Morris
would probably view the allowable ranges in Minnesota's guidelines
cells as either too narrow or too broad. For presumptive commit defendants, the range of presumptive prison terms is very narrow, especially in the upper right corner of the grid (e.g., eighteen to twenty
months). It would be quite difficult to apply much "fine-tuning"
within such a narrow range. However, in practice, this may not be a
serious problem given the frequently used power to mitigate sentence
durations via departures and charge reductions.
In the case of presumptive stay defendants, the "desert range" (from
zero to twelve to zero to thirty months, depending on the cell) may be
26There are, however, a few statutory provisions imposing minimum jail terms; see,
e.g., Minn. Stat. Annot. § 609.583 (presumptive sentence for first-offense residential
burglary is a ninety-day jail term, restitution, or community service).
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broader than Morris would prefer. For example, he suggests that a
range of probation (zero custody) to six months would be appropriate
for second-offense purse-snatchers (Morris 1982, pp. 194-95). However, to say that a range is appropriate does not necessarily mean that
a broader range would be inappropriate, and Morris has always given
greater emphasis to upper (maximum) severity limits than to lower
limits or the goal of equality per se. Thus his principal objection here
would probably not be that the range is too broad but rather that there
are no guidelines at all for the selection of intermediate punishments
within that range.
4. Case-Specific Desert. Morris and Minnesota agree that casespecific desert considerations are part of the "fine-tuning" of the sentence, within the normally applicable limits of maximum and minimum
desert. Morris primarily addressed mitigation based on mental illness
(Morris 1982, pp. 168-69), but in doing so he appeared willing to accept other desert-based, case-specific reasons for adjusting the severity
of the penalty.
5. The Meaning of "Modified" Desert in Minnesota. The Minnesota
commission stated that its original guidelines were based on a theory
of "modified just deserts" (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1980, p. 9). Von Hirsch also discusses this concept, but his usage
differs from the meaning of "modified" deserts in Minnesota-especially as the guidelines have evolved over time. Morris does not mention this term, but his more flexible conception of desert permits a
wide variety of sentencing practices to be viewed as falling within the
range of "deserved" punishment for the offense of conviction. Minnesota's version of "modified" desert appears to be much closer to Morris's "range" theory than to von Hirsch's conception.
In von Hirsch's view, "modified" desert means a "desert-based hybrid" which permits restricted departures from desert, in order to
achieve nondesert sentencing purposes. Such departures are said to be
of two types: "substantial" departures, limited to "extraordinary situations; or more "routine" departures, "with fairly narrow limits on their
permissible extent" (von Hirsch 1994, p. 48, n. 3; see also von Hirsch
1993, chap. 6). Minnesota's recent "dangerous offender" legislation,
appears to fall within von Hirsch's first category.
However, Minnesota also permits at least two types of "routine" departure from von Hirsch's conception of strict, ordinal desert. These
would have to fit within von Hirsch's second category, but neither appears to respect his requirement of "fairly narrow limits" on the extent
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to departure. The very broad range of sanction severity in presumptive
stay cases, accompanied by explicit acceptance of nondesert goals,
would seem to permit routine and major departures from strict ordinal
desert. Alternatively (and more plausibly, given the Minnesota commission's strong emphasis on desert), the treatment of presumptive
stay cases suggests a more flexible, Morris-style "range" conception of
the meaning of "desert" itself.
Similarly, the strong effect of prior record on presumptive dispositions and durations in Minnesota not only exceeds the role that von
Hirsch would allow this factor to play in a purely desert-based system
(von Hirsch 1985, pp. 77-91; von Hirsch 1994, pp. 39-40), it may also
exceed the "narrow limits" of his second category of "modified" desert, described above.27 Again: did the Minnesota commission really intend to authorize routine and major "departures" from desert? Or did
it simply have a more flexible conception of "desert" than von Hirsch
would accept?
The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently does not view the strong
role of prior record as a "departure" from desert. The steep upward
"slope" of the disposition line, for offenders with three or more criminal history points, involves no "departure" from desert because the
court views all disposition decisions as primarily raising issues, not of
what is deserved, but rather of the form of punishment (and whether
the defendant should receive his full deserts); under the court's amenability case law, duration decisions are the measure of what is deserved.
The supreme court does not seem to view the long presumptive durations assigned to offenders with high criminal history scores as exceeding "deserved" punishment. The court has repeatedly stated that
durational departures must be justified by atypical, case-specific culpability. But if the presumptive durations for high-criminal-history offenders were viewed by the court as exceeding desert-presumably for
utilitarian reasons-then the court should have been willing to permit
such nondesert reasons to be used to depart up or down from the presumptive duration. This would be especially appropriate in the case of
mitigating durational departures; if the presumptive sentence were seen
27However, Minnesota did adopt von Hirsch's view that the criminal history scale,
and its effect on the presumptive sentence, should be "closed-ended": at some point (in
Minnesota: when the defendant has six or more criminal history points), the defendant
has reached the full "deserts" applicable to the offense of conviction and cannot receive
any further enhancement for additional prior convictions (von Hirsch 1981a, pp. 61820).
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as exceeding desert, for utilitarian reasons, then such reasons should
quite readily permit downward departure (bringing the sentence back
to "pure" desert, or closer to it).
Thus except for the "dangerous offender" statutes, "modified just
deserts" in Minnesota does not seem to mean "departure" from desert
but rather a broader conception of what "desert" means. Like Morris's
theory, Minnesota's broader conception of desert permits a wide range
of deserved penalties, and a strong role for criminal history.

B. Other Guiding Factors (Fine-Tuning)within Desert Limits
This subsection, which examines Minnesota's approach to incorporation of various punishment rationales in sentencing policy, generally
follows the examination of Morris's views on these subjects set out in
Section IC above.
1. Rehabilitation. Minnesota, like Morris, agrees that rehabilitation
should primarily be pursued out of prison. Thus the defendant's need
for treatment in prison is not a sufficient reason to impose a prison
term (i.e., it is not a basis for an upward dispositional departure), and
prison release does not depend on an assessment of the inmate's progress in treatment. Under the original guidelines, prison programs were
entirely voluntary, as Morris argued they should be, and good-time
credits could not be denied for refusal to participate in treatment programs. Starting in 1993, the Minnesota legislature permitted the commissioner of corrections to define "disciplinary" rules to include not
only violation of general "institution rules" but also refusals to work
and "refusal to participate in treatment or other rehabilitative programs" (Minn. Stat. Annot. § 244.05, subd. lb[b]). Thus to a limited
extent, the inmate's willingness to participate in treatment programs
can now affect the length of his or her prison term. It should be recalled, however, that Morris would allow inmates to be forced to participate in prison programs long enough to "know what it is about"
(Morris 1974, pp. 18-19). In practice, this may be all that Minnesota
requires. It is not clear how often Minnesota inmates are "ordered"
into prison treatment or education programs (as opposed to being ordered to do something, including the option of accepting various institutional work assignments), nor is it known whether unamenable offenders expelled from prison programs continue to forfeit good-time
credits.
Both Morris and Minnesota also permit rehabilitative assessments to
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determine conditions of stayed sentences and of postprison supervised
release.
"But"-Morris might be critical of the rehabilitation-related concepts of "amenability" and "unamenability" to probation, which Minnesota cases recognize as a basis for aggravated and mitigated dispositional departures. Morris generally opposes all individualized
assessments of treatment needs and receptivity, progress toward cure,
and dangerousness.
However, in discussing unamenable-to-probation departures (imposition of prison, instead of the presumptive stayed term), Morris did
suggest that upward departures might be appropriate in "a few such
cases" (Morris 1982, p. 176). Morris was specifically addressing departures based on mental illness, but he might be willing to consider other
offender characteristics which require enhanced severity (within desert
limits). As noted previously, unamenability departures are entered in
less than one percent of presumptive stay cases; thus at least in terms
of frequency, Minnesota practice is consistent with Morris's theory.
Morris has also argued that greater severity is appropriate when "other
less restrictive sanctions have been frequently or recently applied to
this offender" (Morris 1974, pp. 60, 79-80). Many "unamenable-toprobation" departures (including the leading Park case) are based on
prior failures to complete probation.
Morris did not specifically discuss mitigating "amenability" departures (i.e., granting of probation, instead of the presumptive prison
term), but he did address two factors which sometimes underlie a finding of amenability to probation: the offender's support of his wife and
children and his employment at the time of sentencing. At one point,
Morris seems to completely rule out consideration of either factor
(Morris 1982, p. 186); at another point, he admits that as a judge he
would grant mitigation based on family support, but would not say why
(Morris 1982, p. 196). As for employment at sentencing, Morris later
appeared to agree that this factor sometimes permits a different form
of punishment, and perhaps also somewhat lower severity: "To insist
on equal suffering for Criminal B [the more fortunate, employed defendant] because of the adverse social conditions of Criminal A is to
purchase an illusory equality at too high a price. It is a levelling down
and benefits neither Criminal A nor the community. The criminal law
cannot rectify social inequalities; those inequalities will inexorably infect rational punishment policies. But this hypothetical situation leaves
an uneasy sense of moral imbalance and forces us to the consideration
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of how deserved punishments can operate fairly in a world of social
inequality" (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 102-3). It should also be
noted that amenability mitigations are consistent with Morris's more
flexible approach to minimum sanction severity and help to achieve
several of his goals: preservation of the offender's social and community ties, parsimony, and "mercy."
Like Morris, Minnesotans are conflicted and ambivalent about
allowing social and economic factors to influence sentencing. The
guidelines formally rule out any consideration of family or employment status, but these factors find considerable acceptance in practice
and are indirectly sanctioned by the amenable-to-probation case law.
Finally, as to both types of amenability departure, Morris would certainly be sympathetic to the practical realities of implementing sentencing reforms: Minnesota trial judges, attorneys, and probation officers believe strongly in the appropriateness of amenability departures.
Morris is a realist. Thus he might very well conclude that, in a heavily
treatment-oriented state like Minnesota, it is wiser to permit (and then
seek to regulate) amenability departures, rather than attempt to prohibit them; total prohibition in this context, as in many others, only
invites subterfuge and evasion (Morris and Hawkins 1977, p. 21; Morris 1982, p. 158; Morris 1992, p. 139).
2. Incapacitation. Minnesota and Morris both sharply limit the extent to which individualized predictions of offender "dangerousness"
may affect sentencing severity. Morris would never allow sentences to
be increased on this basis above maximum desert and would very rarely
permit enhancement within the desert range; however, he would permit some "anamnestic" predictions of risk (based on the offender's
past behavior) to affect conditions of probation or parole.
Similarly, Minnesota permits dangerousness considerations to affect
probation conditions, as well as the selection of the precise prison duration within the range of presumptive executed prison terms. The
Minnesota guidelines prohibit aggravated durational departures based
on offender dangerousness. However, recent "dangerous offender"
statutes appear to permit enhancement of duration without regard to
guidelines measures of desert, for certain narrowly defined groups of
offenders.
Although upward dispositional departures cannot be based solely on
a finding of offender dangerousness, such departures (as well as probation revocations) are sometimes based on a finding of "unamenability"
to probation. Such a finding, in turn, is often supported in part by con-
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cerns that the offender is too dangerous to remain on probation. Morris would only support such enhancements if the prison term imposed
does not exceed the upper limits of desert and if dangerousness assessments are limited to rare cases. These conditions appear to be met, in
Minnesota; "unamenability" departures are very rare and do not appear to exceed the maximum deserts of presumptive stay defendants (as
measured by the duration of the prison term for that grid cell).
3. Failure of Prior,Lesser Penalties; Categoric Recidivist Enhancements.
Morris supports increased punishment (within desert limits) when
"other less restrictive sanctions have been frequently or recently applied to this offender" (Morris 1974, pp. 60, 79-80). He also accepts
enhanced punishment for recidivists as a group, seeing such enhancement as justified on both incapacitative and desert grounds (Morris
1982, pp. 162-63).
Minnesota occasionally permits aggravated dispositional departure
based on defendant "unamenability" (which, in turn, is often based
on prior failures to successfully complete probation). Minnesota also
strongly links punishment severity to criminal history.
4. General Deterrence. Morris would permit enhancement for deterrent purposes (exemplary punishment) within the range of deserved
penalties. Minnesota permits consideration of special needs for deterrence, within the range of presumptive executed prison terms, and in
deciding on conditions of probation. Consistent with Morris's views,
special needs for deterrence are not a proper basis for aggravated durational departure; such departures must be desert-based.
5. Equality (Uniformity). Minnesota and Morris agree that equality
is an important goal but appear-at least on first inspection-to differ
as to just how important it is. Morris states that equality is only a
"guiding" principle, which will often be "trumped" by other considerations-especially "parsimony." The Minnesota Guidelines Commission identified uniformity as a major goal (Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1984, pp. v, 33-53).
However, the Minnesota commission also recognized the goal of
case-level parsimony which, because it allows sentences to depend on
case-specific utilitarian needs, is often in conflict with equality (Tonry
1994, p. 62). Moreover, the commission has provided very little guidance as to the specific type or severity of nonimprisonment sanctions
and has not tried to regulate prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining, which permit considerable "adjustment" of the commission's
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seemingly strict prison commitment and duration presumptions. Minnesota case law has added additional flexibility to the commission's
rules. Thus in practice, Minnesota's system seems to be much closer
to Morris's theory than to von Hirsch's in terms of the importance of
equality.
6. Parsimony and Community-Based Sentencing. Both Morris and
Minnesota accept the principle of parsimony: a preference for the least
restrictive alternative consistent with the purposes of the particular
sentence. Morris and Minnesota both prefer nonprison sanctions and
strongly support community-based sentencing. As noted in Section III
above, nonprison sentences constitute about 80 percent of felony sentences in Minnesota. Furthermore, mitigating departures far outnumber aggravated departures, under the guidelines, and the difference is
even greater when de facto mitigating departures (achieved by charging discretion) are included (Frase 1993a, pp. 299-303, 317-18).
"But"-Morris's concept of parsimony appears to apply to all issues
of sentencing, including conditions of probation, whereas the Minnesota commission's statement of this principle only seems to apply to
the use of custodial sentences (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § I[3]). Also, Morris implies a general preference in favor of sentencing toward the low end of the "desert" range, and he
may further assume that judges will use the bottom of that range as a
starting point. In Minnesota, the "starting point" for sentencing of
cases falling below the disposition line is the midpoint of the range of
presumptive prison terms; for cases falling above the disposition line,
no specific guidance or starting point is provided.
However, in practice Minnesota judges prefer to use the lower half
of the available range of custodial terms. Thus in over three-quarters
of the grid cells below the disposition line, the average length of prison
terms imposed is less than the presumptive midpoint for that cell
(Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995a, pp. 31, 51). As
for cases above the disposition line, prison terms are rarely imposed,
and the duration of jail terms imposed is modest (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995a, pp. 21, 32): in only two of these
twenty-six cells is the average duration greater than half of the maximum (twelve-month) jail term allowed (and average jail durations are
far lower than the presumptive stayed prison term, in all grid cells). All
of these judicial preferences for "low end" sentencing would appear
even stronger if custody durations were analyzed relative to the higher-
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severity grid cells in which many of these defendants would have been
convicted had they not received charging leniency (Frase 1993a, pp.
301-3, 317-18).
"But"- Morris would still probably say that Minnesota relies too
heavily on jail terms and should instead use fines and other intermediate sanctions (Morris and Hawkins 1970, pp. 142-43; Morris and
Tonry 1990, p. 79). About two-thirds of convicted felons in Minnesota
now receive a local jail sentence. Moreover, the frequency of such sentences has grown considerably since guidelines sentencing began-in
1978, only 35 percent of felons received a jail sentence (Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995a, p. 21). As discussed more
fully below, Morris would also lament the lack of any limits or guidelines for the use of jail terms.
Morris would probably appreciate that Minnesota uses jail terms in
many cases where other states impose prison (Frase 1993a, p. 332, n.
120); thus he might agree that, if a custody term is deemed necessary,
it is better that it be shorter and served closer to the defendant's home
community. It should also be recalled that, even when jail inmates are
counted, Minnesota's arrest-based custodial sentencing rate (inmates
per weighted adult arrest) remained constant throughout the 1980s
(while the rate for the nation as a whole increased by 80 percent); Minnesota's jail population, as well as its prison population, increased only
as much as would be expected, given increased arrests and felony caseloads. It thus appears that the increase in felony jail sentencing was
balanced by decreased use of jails for pretrial detention and misdemeanor sentencing. Such a substitution effect is a very defensible allocation of limited resources.
7. Rewarding Guilty Pleas and Other Forms of Cooperation. Minnesota and Morris both permit good-time credits, in recognition of the
need to maintain order in prison, once parole release discretion has
been eliminated.
The Minnesota Guidelines Commission, like Morris, was concerned
about disparity resulting from plea bargaining. The guidelines specify
that "the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant during the

adjudication process" may not be a basis for departure (Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995b, § II.D.l.e). However, this
carefully worded language does not prohibit the granting of leniency
to defendants who waive, rather than "exercise," their rights. In practice, the defendant's plea remains a major factor in the granting of formal mitigating departures and is undoubtedly at least as strong a factor
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in charge reductions which produce de facto mitigating departures;
plea bargaining is "alive and well" in Minnesota (Frase 1993a, pp. 310,
316-19).
Morris advocated stricter "regulation" of guilty-plea-based sentences, by means of judicially supervised "settlement" conferences.
However, he appeared to assume that some degree of sentence mitigation would continue to be available in such conferences. He would also
support the commission's implicit judgment that plea-rewarding mitigations are not as bad as trial-punishing aggravations (in part because,
under both the Minnesota and Morris approaches, minimum-severity
limits are more flexible), and he would appreciate that plea-bargained
mitigations are one of the most common vehicles for achieving parsimony and "mercy" in sentencing.
The pervasive need to reward guilty pleas and other forms of defendant cooperation has important theoretical implications, in the
Morris-von Hirsch debate. All modern adjudication and sentencing
schemes depend to a great extent on the cooperation of defendants.
Before and at trial, defendants must be promised leniency to induce
and reward guilty pleas, jury trial waivers, testimony against other defendants, and so forth. At sentencing, the court must initially "underpunish" (give defendants less than they deserve)-not only to reward the defendant's cooperation up to that point but also to induce
further cooperation (in holding employment, family support, restitution, treatment, supervision, etc.) and leave room for subsequent tightening of sanctions (e.g., by revocation of probation or loss of goodtime credits) if the defendant fails to cooperate.
Although some forms of cooperation might be seen as reducing
the defendant's "deserts" (at least under a broad definition of that
term), many forms do not; society often needs, and must reward,
cooperation whether or not mitigation is deserved. Thus in practice,
modern systems of law enforcement and punishment always function
according to a "limiting" retributive model-most defendants do
cooperate, at least to some extent, and thus receive less than their
full "just deserts." In the real world of sentencing, a system of strict
"defining" desert is unworkable. Moreover, any attempt to impose
such a strict system is very likely to result in the imposition of
excessive and undeserved severity-on defendants who refuse to
cooperate. The position of Morris and other limiting retributivists
is clear: punishment in excess of desert is unacceptable; excessive
leniency is a less serious moral and political problem. The approach
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is both practical and principled; it is deliberately "biased" in favor
of defendants, for reasons similar to those underlying the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Other Important Sentencing Issues
At least in stayed prison cases (over three-quarters of presumptive
terms, and about 80 percent of actual sentences), Minnesota follows
Morris's proposal that the judge should first decide the sentencing purpose or purposes to be served and should then select a package of intermediate sanctions designed to parsimoniously achieve those purposes.
In presumptive prison cases Minnesota judges have much less
choice, at least formally. The judge must ordinarily sentence within
a very narrow range of prison terms and may consider only whether
exceptional factors of desert justify an aggravated or mitigated durational departure; or whether the defendant's "amenability to probation" (or, rarely, exceptionally mitigated culpability) justifies a mitigated dispositional departure. However, Morris did agree that
presumptive prison, with few case-level options, is appropriate for the
most serious cases. He would draw the line at cases presumptively punished with at least twenty-four months of actual incarceration (i.e.,
after subtraction of good-time credits). In Minnesota, most of the presumptive prison cases falling below the disposition line have presumptive minimum prison terms (after deduction of maximum good-time
credit) at least this long: thirty-five of the forty-four grid cells below
the line have presumptive minimum durations of at least twenty-four
months.28
1. Nature and Scope of Guidelines. Morris felt that additional guidance could be provided to trial courts by the use of multiple presumptions or "bands" on the sentencing grid; for example, he expressed approval of a four-band grid: never prison; presume no prison, absent
departure; permit either prison or community-based sanctions; and always prison (Morris and Tonry 1990, pp. 60, 77).
Minnesota's grid only has two formal "bands": presume no prison
and presume prison. However, in practice, four bands are clearly discernible, year after year. In the upper left corner of the grid, there are
28 Minimum prison terms for presumptive commit cases falling above the disposition
line (mainly weapons and recidivist sex offenders) are shorter. However, departure rates
are extremely high in these cases (Frase 1993a, p. 309), so judges in practice exercise
broad discretion in the selection of sentencing purposes and alternatives.
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several cells in which prison is almost completely absent; in the bottom
two rows (murder cases), prison is almost always imposed; in the center
of the grid, on either side of the disposition line, are two bands of cells
with very high departure rates (aggravated departures, in cells just
above the line; mitigated departures, just below) (Frase 1993a, p. 323
[1989 data]; Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1995a,
p. 21 [1993 data]).
"But"-there remains one very important departure from Morris's
theory: Minnesota has declined to enact any guidelines, or even any
"equivalency" or "exchange" rates, for nonprison sanctions. The Minnesota commission has considered the possibility of such guidelines on
several occasions but has declined to adopt them-primarily because
of massive resistance of attorneys, judges, and probation officers, but
also due to a lack of commission consensus on specific stay guidelines.
Experience under the guidelines has clearly shown that, where field resistance is high and consensus is lacking, guidelines rules have been
widely evaded (Frase 1993a, p. 337). Morris thus would appreciate the
commission's dilemma and might hesitate to impose highly unpopular
rules.

However, Morris would still probably insist that some form of guidance is feasible and desirable here. He would be particularly interested
in guidelines that limit the maximum aggregate severity of stay conditions (using a point system and equivalency scales), and he might also
want to set upper limits on jail sentences, in each guidelines cell. As I
have argued elsewhere at greater length (Frase 1993c, pp. 19-23), stay
guidelines would prevent unjustly severe sentences, would encourage
substitution of noncustodial sanctions, and would give courts more
concrete guidance in assessing the overall "onerousness" of stay conditions, for purposes of deciding when defendants may demand execution of the stayed prison term (State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508
[Minn. 1982]).
At the same time, I have argued that there are some very serious
hurdles to overcome in enacting stay condition guidelines-especially
those that impose minimum sanction severity. Such guidelines might
prove undesirable for one or more of the following reasons (most of
which Morris would probably accept):
a. Stay limitations would make the guidelines much more complex,
whereas a major goal of the Minnesota commission has always been
simplicity of application (Frase 1993a, pp. 281-82). Simplicity serves
to promote broader understanding and acceptance of the rules and to
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reduce errors of application. Indeed, the unpopularity of the federal
sentencing guidelines may be due, at least in part, to their complexity.
Morris has recognized that, in general, "simpler is better" (Morris and
Tonry 1990, p. 78); at some point, the cost of further complexity outweighs any added benefits.
b. What are the benefits here? Given the upper limits already imposed by the Randolph case, the frequency and degree of disparity in
the imposition of stay conditions may not be very great and may seem
less troubling than disparity in the imposition and duration of prison
terms. Morris himself has argued that equality is only one consideration and may be outweighed by other factors. Minnesotans appear to
agree and have been content with the current system for over fifteen
years. Like Morris, and unlike von Hirsch, Minnesotans do not seem
to feel that occasional, or even frequent, imposition of more severe stay
conditions on less culpable offenders is "too unfair." If desert and
equality goals do not require closer regulation in this context, then trial
courts should retain discretion to tailor stay conditions to the particular purposes at sentencing and should remain free to mitigate punishment for reasons of parsimony-to avoid imposing greater severity
when it would not serve any practical purpose.
c. Minimum requirements for stay condition severity are designed to
increase the onerousness of stay conditions. But stricter or more numerous stay conditions inevitably mean an increase in the frequency of
probation violations and thus at least some increase in prison commitment rates (Tonry 1994, p. 61). Minimum stay condition requirements
also tend to reduce the court's reserved sentencing power, on revocation of the stay. If (as seems only fair) defendants are credited with the
equivalent, in prison days, of the stay conditions already completed
(von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene 1989, p. 610)-just as they are now
credited with any days spent in local jail-then more onerous stay conditions mean that there is less deserved punishment "left over" to use
as a sanction for violation of such conditions. Conversely, less severe
stay conditions reduce the risk of noncompliance and increase the incentive to fulfill all conditions (because the defendant faces swift execution of most of the stayed prison term).
d. Minimum stay conditions-especially jail terms-risk overloading
the available corrections resources in many counties, especially those
which are locally funded. Moreover, periodic overload is a greater risk
at the local than at the state level; given the smaller scale of local operations, criminal caseloads and available capacities are probably subject
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to wider day-to-day fluctuations than occur in larger, statewide systems.
e. Flexibility in the imposition of stay conditions permits a desirable
degree of "local control," so that sentencing policy and the use of local
resources may reflect important variations in local values and traditions.
f Experiments with stay guidelines in other states suggest some difficulty in achieving consensus as to specific equivalency or exchange
rates for widely differing sanction types.
g. Stay guidelines-especially minimum severity requirementswould be very difficult to enforce consistently. Prosecutors are already
very unlikely to appeal leniency in the application of the existing prison
guidelines (Frase 1991a, pp. 752-73; Frase 1993a, pp. 316-19). Prosecutors would be even less likely to appeal departures from stay guidelines, given the lesser degree of severity and disparity involved. Defendant appeals (of sentences exceeding stay condition maxima) are more
likely, but extremely onerous stay conditions are already substantially
limited by the Randolph rule.
h. If lower limits on stay condition severity are unenforceable, and
perhaps undesirable, could upper limits alone be adopted? Or would
such a proposal fail to gain sufficient bipartisan support within the
commission, and elsewhere, thus forcing the adoption of minimum severity limits?
In sum, it will be quite difficult to implement and enforce any comprehensive system regulating conditions of stayed sentences, especially
a system imposing minimum requirements of sanction severity. Morris
would probably agree with many of the reasons why Minnesota has
thus far declined to adopt any such system. Nevertheless, he might still
argue for a more limited version of stay guidelines.
2. Sentencing Appeals. To maximize guidance to trial judges in sentencing, Morris and Minnesota both support the development of a
substantial body of appellate case law-a "common law of sentencing."
Minnesota case law extensively defines the desert and nondesert factors
which may appropriately be considered as a basis for departure, although it has done little to address fine-tuning within the range permitted by presumptive disposition and duration rules. In the case of
presumptive commit cases, this may be because the ranges are already
quite narrow. The ranges are much broader in presumptive stay cases;
the problems of providing detailed guidance for these cases are discussed above.
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To make appellate review of sentences more effective, Morris proposed that the trial court should state reasons for its sentence, if an
appeal is filed. Minnesota requires the trial court to state reasons
whenever the sentence is a departure from the guidelines (which, as a
practical matter, is the only time a sentence is likely to be appealed,
given the Minnesota Supreme Court's reluctance to reverse nondeparture sentences; State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6 [Minn. 1981]).
3. Parole and Prison Population Control. Given Minnesota's and
Morris's rejection of the "rehabilitative ideal" of coerced, in-prison
treatment, and their further rejection of most forms of selective incapacitation via imprisonment, it was natural that both would eventually
favor abolition of discretionary parole release. Both also recognized the
need for additional mechanisms to control prison population size, if
parole is abolished.
"But"-Minnesota approached the problem of prison population
control in a manner different than Morris anticipated. Morris had initially proposed to retain parole, as a prison population "safety valve"
(but with parole guidelines and the setting of target release dates soon
after the offender's arrival in prison). Like almost all other early proponents of sentencing reform, Morris did not foresee the use of sentencing guidelines as a means of "front-end" resource management, via sophisticated computer-based projections of the prison population
impact of proposed guidelines. Minnesota pioneered this approach,
and it has been a central feature of state guidelines systems since the
mid-1980s (Frase 1995b, pp. 173-74, 175-76). However, Morris did
foresee and appreciate the value of having prison commitment and duration decisions made by a body insulated from direct electoral political pressures.
V. Conclusion
Although the Minnesota guidelines give greater emphasis to retributive values than did the previous, indeterminate sentencing regime,
Minnesota guidelines sentencing is, and has always been, much closer
to Morris's "limiting retributive" approach than to the more "defining" desert theory advocated by von Hirsch. Retributive values set firm
upper limits on sanction severity in Minnesota but rather weak lower
limits (or none at all). Judges and attorneys retain substantial discretion
to consider utilitarian sentencing goals and to vary the form and severity of the sentence. Uniformity and proportionality of sentencing have
increased under the guidelines. But Minnesotans appear to agree with
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Morris that these are only two of the many important goals of, and at,
sentencing. All in all, Minnesota's hybrid sentencing system has
achieved an appropriate and stable compromise, balancing the values
of uniformity versus case-level flexibility, retributive versus utilitarian
goals, and public protection versus parsimony and fiscal limitations
(Frase 1993c, pp. 13-33). Such balance is the essence of Morris's approach.
How was it that Minnesota policy makers came to adopt so much of
Morris's theory without, as far as this writer can tell, ever specifically
citing his writings? It is possible that Morris's theory indirectly affected policy developments in Minnesota through his strong influence
on the thinking of other scholars and reformers in the late 1970sespecially the drafters of the second edition of the American Bar Association Standards on Sentencing (American Bar Association 1979; von
Hirsch 1981b, pp. 783-84). Of course, the currents of influence have
also flowed in the other direction: Morris continued to develop his theory after the Minnesota guidelines were implemented. Although his
later writings clearly built on themes which he had begun to develop
many years before, they were also strongly influenced by the new concepts and procedures being pioneered in Minnesota (and later, in many
other states, and in the federal courts).
In seeking to understand the remarkable correspondence between
Morris's theory and the theory that has evolved in Minnesota, it is important to recognize that Minnesota's current sentencing system is not
the product of any single person, group, or agency. Rather, the Minnesota approach was the combined result of decisions made, over a period
of several years, by the legislature, the guidelines commission, the supreme court, trial courts, prosecuting and defense attorneys, correctional officers, and perhaps even victims and defendants. These key
actors not only did not consult Morris, they generally did not consult
each other in any systematic way. Yet they settled on a theory of
punishment which is coherent, balanced, and workable. Perhaps the
best explanation, then, for the many similarities between Minnesota's
and Morris's theory is to be found in Morris's empirically based,
consensus-seeking, "from-the-ground-up" approach. Morris has always
sought guidance in the actual practices of system actors and has tried
to craft an approach which will gain broad acceptance (Morris and
Tonry 1990, pp. 87-88, 108). (If only the drafters of the muchcriticized federal guidelines had followed this approach.) Morris's theory became reality in Minnesota because Morris was articulating fun-
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damental and widely held values that will, and must, be accommodated
in any progressive sentencing reform which is likely to be adopted and
to survive. Whether such a sentencing theory could be adopted and
survive in a less politically progressive state, or in a more punitive age,
is another matter.
What will the future hold, in Minnesota? Will Morris's humane and
efficient model continue to survive? No American state-Minnesota
included-is immune from periods of "crime wave" hysteria, "law and
order" political posturing, and strong public pressure to increase criminal penalties. In the late 1980s, Minnesota began to experience
alarming increases in rates of violent crime-despite the fact that violent crime penalties were already quite severe. Drug crime rates also
increased, as the epidemic of crack cocaine, the "War on Drugs," and
the problems of deteriorating inner cities finally "arrived" in Minnesota. In 1986, the Minnesota legislature began a steady increase in the
severity of drug penalties (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1992, pp. 3-5); further major increases in sentencing severity for
violent crimes were enacted by the sentencing guidelines commission
in 1989 and by the legislature in 1989 and 1992 (Frase 1993b, pp. 35963).
Von Hirsch has suggested that these increases in severity could be
the result of Minnesota's more flexible, Morris-style "limiting retributive" model-or, at least, that such a model provides a weaker basis
for criticism than von Hirsch's more restrictive concept of desert (von
Hirsch 1994, pp. 39-45). It is certainly true that von Hirsch's strict
requirements of ordinal desert, if accepted in Minnesota, would have
made it more difficult to selectively increase penalties for drug and violent crimes. Readers will have to decide for themselves whether von
Hirsch's one-dimensional theory could ever have been implemented in
Minnesota, and even if it could have, whether such a theory would
have better helped Minnesota to resist very strong political pressures
to increase penalties. The danger under von Hirsch's theory is that
such pressures will lead to an escalation of the entire penalty scale, resulting in unwanted (and very expensive) increased severity for lesser
offenders or massive increases in departure rates and disparity for such
offenders.
It should also be kept in mind that, notwithstanding recent increases
in sentencing severity and inmate populations, Minnesota sentencing
remains-by any American standard of comparison-a model of the
"parsimonious" use of custodial sanctions. Von Hirsch would only
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permit parsimony to be considered by the legislature and the sentencing commission, and only in the determination of "cardinal" sentencing policy issues. But parsimony is too important a concept to be so
limited in its application. It encourages moderation in sentencing and
serves as an essential counterweight to the strong, ever-present political pressure to escalate penalties beyond what is necessary (and often,
beyond what the public is actually willing to fund). For this reason,
Minnesota and Morris recognize the value of parsimony in all sentencing policy and application decisions.
It must be recognized, however, that much of Minnesota's success
in holding the line in sentencing severity during the 1980s was due
to another factor: the high priority which the Minnesota sentencing
guidelines commission placed on avoiding prison overcrowding. Minnesota's "capacity constraint" (the goal of never exceeding 95 percent
of current or planned capacity) was a very wise strategy, reflecting two
fundamental truths about American sentencing in the late twentieth
century. First, expansion of prison capacity is a slow process, and legislators often fail to provide sufficient funds in time to avoid significant
overcrowding; the best way to avoid such overcrowding is to adopt the
conservative assumption that no further prison expansion will be provided. Second, all American jurisdictions (state and federal) already
have substantial capacity to incarcerate; by any rational standard (and
certainly, by any international standard; Frase 1995c, p. 275; Frase and
Weigend 1995, pp. 346-48), American jurisdictions are already making excessive use of custodial sanctions. The question is, thus, not
whether more capacity is needed but rather whether better use could
be made of the existing capacity. The assumption of no further growth
in capacity encourages the sentencing commission and other policy
makers to explore alternatives to incarceration that may be just as
effective and are almost always cheaper and more humane (Morris
and Tonry 1990). Such an assumption, coupled with sophisticated,
computer-generated inmate population projections, also forces advocates of greater severity, both within the commission and outside it, to
take responsibility for the fiscal impact of their proposals, in terms of
increased taxes or reduced penalties for other offenders (Parent 1988,
pp. 43-44).
Thus it may very well be that Morris's principle of parsimony would
not have been effective in Minnesota, if it had not been combined with
"capacity-based" sentencing policy. But at the same time, capacitybased sentencing policy may not work without case-level parsimony.
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Prison population projections are still an inexact science, and the Minnesota commission has often seriously underestimated the impact of
rising caseloads, changing prosecutorial charging practices, legislative
changes, and other factors which increase prison populations (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1984, pp. 90-91). Fortunately, the commission also underestimated various mitigating factors
(especially rates of downward dispositional departure and charge reductions; Frase 1991a, p. 735). If the guidelines had not included so
many possibilities for case-level mitigation, it is very likely that sentencing severity, inmate populations, and prison overcrowding would
have increased substantially.
Minnesota's pioneering sentencing reform has now been emulated
in almost twenty states and has also recently been endorsed by the
American Bar Association (American Bar Association 1993; Frase
1995a, pp. 169, 197; Frase 1995b, p. 174). Increasingly, states are turning to guidelines as a means of gaining better predictions of, and control over, rapidly escalating prison populations and correctional costs
(Frase 1995b, p. 175). But reformers should not lose sight of the original goal of sentencing guidelines: to promote more rational and fair
sentencing. They should look to Minnesota not only for guidance in
controlling prison populations but also for an example of a balanced,
humane, and effective sentencing system. And they should look to
Morris's writings for an original and often eloquent statement of the
key features of, and rationale behind, the Minnesota "model."
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